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INTRODUCTION

In recent years, the subject of attorneys' fees has become the
focal point of pressures to improve the accessibility of legal services
for those unable to pay large fees. Courts, scholars, and special
interest groups have examined in detail the relationship between
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fees and the ability to assert legal rights. This increased scrutiny has
led to the elimination of minimum fee schedules, the criticism of
and possible relaxation of restrictions on fee advertising, and the
establishment of maximum contingent fee schedules by court rule.
Private enforcement of newly enacted federal statutes against private corporations and state governments has created controversy
over exceptions to the traditional rule against fee shifting and the
scope of the bar of the eleventh amendment. These debates and the
decisions accompanying them have important implications for the
issue of whether, in a pragmatic sense, private citizens and organizations may be expected to play a major role in enforcing public
rights and standards of governmental conduct. This project will
consider recent developments in the attorneys' fee area by analyzing
the legal background of each problem and the implications of the
last year's developments.
II.

MINIMUM FEE SCHEDULES AND ANTITRUST LAW

Because minimum fee schedules suggested or promulgated by
bar associations restrict competitive pricing in the legal profession,
the question whether they violate the antitrust laws has evoked
considerable debate and commentary.1 Opponents of these schedules allege that setting a price floor for legal services constitutes
price-fixing, a per se violation of the Sherman Act.2 Defenders of fee
schedules counter with two arguments. First, they contend that a
"learned professions" exemption to the antitrust laws exists for the
practice of law, because it is not "trade or commerce." Secondly,
they argue that the Sherman Act does not apply to fee schedules
promulgated by bar associations because the schedules constitute
state regulation immune from the proscriptions of the Act. The
United States Supreme Court recently laid this controversy to rest
in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar.' Rejecting the contentions of the
proponents of the schedules, the Court held that minimum fee
schedules operate to fix prices in contravention of section 1 of the
1. See, e.g., Arnould & Corley, Fee Schedules Should Be Abolished, 57 A.B.A.J. 655
(1971); Ferren & Snyder, Antitrust and EthicalAspects of Lawyers' Minimum Fee Schedules,
7 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 726 (1972); Comment, Minimum Fee Schedules as Price.Fixing:
A Per Se Violation of the Sherman Act, 22 AM. U.L. REV. 439 (1973); Comment, Bar Association Minimum Fee Schedules and the Antitrust Laws, 1974 DUKE L.J. 1164; Note, A Critical
Analysis of Bar AssociationMinimum Fee Schedules, 85 HARv. L. REV. 971 (1972); Comment,
Minimum Fee Schedules: An Antitrust Problem, 48 TUL. L. REV. 682 (1974).
2. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
3. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
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Sherman Act.' In resolving the debate, the Court eliminated an
artificial price floor for many legal services.
A. Legal Background
(1) The Professions as "Trade or Commerce"
Proponents of minimum fee schedules have contended that the
practice of a profession is not "trade or commerce" within the meaning of the Sherman Act.5 Although the Supreme Court has construed broadly the jurisdictional words "trade or commerce"' and
has been reluctant to find exceptions,' several Court cases have
suggested that such an exemption may exist. The origin of the
"learned profession" doctrine lies in Federal Baseball Club v. National League,8 a 1922 case in which the Court held professional
baseball immune from the antitrust laws. Although baseball was
played for profit, the Court reasoned that it did not constitute
"trade or commerce" because "personal effort, not related to production, is not a subject of commerce." 9 To support its statement
that personal services are not "trades," the Court cited the legal
profession as an example: "a firm of lawyers sending out a member
to argue a case

. . .

does not engage in

. .

.commerce.""''

The Court also referred to an exemption for professional activities in two later decisions. In the 1931 case of FTC v. Raladam Co.,1"
the Federal Trade Commission questioned whether the competitive
practices used by medicine sellers violated section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act. 2 In dicta the Court noted that the medical
profession might be injured by these practices, and distinguished
4. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
5. Section 1 states that "[e]very contract, combination . . . , or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several states . . ." is unlawful. 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1970). (emphasis added)
6. In United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 553 (1944), the
Court stated that "trade" included "every person engaged in business whose activities might
restrain or monopolize commercial intercourse . . ." Similarly, in United States v. National
Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485, 491 (1950), the Court declared that "[ult is in that
broad sense that 'trade' is used in the Sherman Act."
7. The Court has declared that "if exceptions are to be written into the Sherman Act,
they must come from Congress, not this Court." United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters
Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 561 (1944).
8. 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
9. Id. at 209.
10. Id.
11. 283 U.S. 643 (1931).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970). The Federal Trade Commission Act is construed in pari
materiawith the Sherman Act. American Cyanimid Co. v. FTC, 363 F.2d 757, 770 (6th Cir.
1966).
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vendors from medical practitioners, declaring that the latter "follow
a profession and not a trade."'" A similar dictum appears in the 1932
case of Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States,'4 in which
the Court held that cleaners and dyers were engaged in a "trade."
To support its holding, the Court quoted from an earlier opinion' 5
dealing with the broad definition of that term:
Wherever any occupation, employment, or business is carried on for the purpose of profit, or gain, or a livelihood, not in the liberal arts or in the learned
professions, it is constantly called a trade.'"

Apart from the dicta in these cases, the Court has expressed a
policy basis for differentiating between business and professional
activities. In Semler v. Oregon State Board of Dental Examiners'7
the Court upheld a state statute prohibiting advertising by dentists.
The Court based its holding upon a state interest in restricting
professional advertising. It recognized that competitive activities by
professionals might be injurious to the public:
The community is concerned with the maintenance of professional standards
which will insure not only competency in individual practitioners . . . but
against practices which would tend to demoralize the profession by forcing its
members into an unseemly rivalry which would enlarge the opportunities of
the least scrupulous.'

A later case, United States v. Oregon State Medical Society,'9 expressed the same policy in holding suppliers of prepaid medical care
immune from the Sherman Act. Although the Court did not base
its decision upon the "learned profession" dicta in prior cases, its
reasoning supported the concept of a professional exemption. Observing that special considerations attach to the physician-patient
relationship, the Court declared that "forms of competition usual
in the business world may be demoralizing to the ethical standards
'2
of a profession.

In subsequent cases the Supreme Court avoided direct evaluation of the question of a "learned profession" exemption, while incidentally placing its existence in substantial doubt. In American
MedicalAssociation v. United States2 ' the defendants were charged
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

283 U.S. at 653.
286 U.S. 427 (1932).
The Schooner Nymph, 18 F. Cas. 506 (No. 10, 388) (C.C.D. Me. 1834).
286 U.S. at 436.
294 U.S. 608 (1935).
Id. at 612.
343 U.S. 326 (1952).
Id. at 336.
317 U.S. 519 (1943).
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with violating section 3 of the Sherman Act 22 by impeding the development of a prepaid medical group. Although the defendant AMA
argued that it was exempt from the antitrust laws because the practice of medicine was not "trade or commerce," the Court declined
to rule on the issue. The Court instead found the occupation of the
defendants immaterial when they conspired to restrain nonprofessional commerce.3 In United States v. NationalAssociation
of Real EstateBoards,' 4 the Court held that a fee schedule for realtor
services violated section 3 of the Sherman Act. In contrast to its
statement in FederalBaseball,2 1 the Court said, "The fact that the
business involves the sale of personal services rather than commodities does not take it out of the category of 'trade' ... "2 Although
the Court reversed its position that all services are exempt from the
Act, it again intimated no opinion on the correctness of the application of the term "trade" to the professions.2 By narrowing the applicability of the possible exemption to professional services, the
Court's holding undermines the existence of a "learned profession"
exception.2 9 Furthermore, a more recent case suggests that such a
distinction does not exist. In United States v. Utah Pharmaceutical
Association,30 the District Court for the District of Utah held that
price schedules for prescription drugs violated section 1 of the Sherman Act. Citing the Supreme Court's decisions in American Medical Association and NationalAssociation of Real Estate Boards, the
court declared that simply because goods in commerce are made by
persons having a learned profession they are not exempt from antitrust regulation. 31 The Supreme Court affirmed per curiam, perhaps
implicitly agreeing that a professional association could act in restraint of trade when engaged in activities related to its own profes32
sion.
Although doubt has been cast upon the validity of a complete
22. Section 3 of the Act is substantially similar to § 1, but applies to restraints of trade
in the District of Columbia and the territories.
23. 317 U.S. at 528.
24. 339 U.S. 485 (1950).
25. See note 22 supra.
26. See text accompanying notes 8-10 supra.
27. 339 U.S. at 490.
28. Id. at 492.
29. Comment, Bar Association Minimum Fee Schedules and the Antitrust Laws, 1974
DUKE L.J. 1164.
30. 201 F. Supp. 29 (D. Utah), appeal dismissed, 306 F.2d 493 (10th Cir.), aff'd mem.,
371 U.S. 24 (1962).
31. 201 F. Supp. at 33.
32. Comment, supra note 29, at 1205-06.
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learned professions exemption, a partial exemption may exist where
anticompetitive activities have a noncommercial purpose. The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals expressed this approach
in Marjorie Webster Junior College, Inc. v. Middle States Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools, Inc.33 In that case, a profitmaking junior college sought to enjoin enforcement of a rule denying
accreditation to schools operated for profit. The plaintiffs argued
that the defendant accreditation association's procedures violated
section 3 of the Sherman Act. The court, however, found that the
defendant's activities were immune from the Act because their purpose was primarily noncommercial. 4 The court reasoned that "the
proscriptions of the Sherman Act were 'tailored. . .for the business
world,' not for the noncommercial aspects of the liberal arts and
learned professions. 3 The decision therefore suggests that while
certain commercially oriented anticompetitive practices of professions will be subject to the antitrust laws, other anticompetitive
practices may be immune.
(2)

State Action Immunity

The Supreme Court first articulated the doctrine of state action
immunity in Parker v. Brown,3" in which it held that Congress did
not intend that the Sherman Act apply to anticompetitive activities
engaged in by the states. In Parker,a producer of raisins sought to
enjoin enforcement of state-imposed limits on raisin acreage. The
Court recognized that had the program been organized and carried
out by private persons, an antitrust violation would have occurred,
but held that the Act did not forbid a program authorized and
directed by a state. 8 The Court noted, however, that this immunity
does not extend to all state action: a state cannot authorize private
violations of the Act, 39 nor become a mere participant in private
action.40
Although the Court in Parkercited two examples in which the
33. 432 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970).
34. Id. at 655.
35. Id. at 654.
36. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
37. ". . . Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize . . . shall be deemed guilty of a
misdemeanor. . ." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970). (emphasis added)
38. 317 U.S. at 350.
39. ". . . a state does not give immunity to those who violate the Sherman Act by
authorizing them to violate it, or by declaring that their action is lawful ... " Id. at 351.
40. Id. at 351-52.
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state action immunity would not apply, it did not give any practical
standards for making a determination; nor have later cases done
much to elucidate this murky problem." Lower courts most often
seem to use two tests in deciding whether immunity exists. First,
many courts examine whether legislative policy mandates the anticompetitive conduct. " The rationale behind this judicial inquiry is
to prevent immunity for conduct that the state never intended to
be immunized. 3 For an activity to receive immunity, the legislature
must have expressed its view that competition is undesirable or
have enacted a scheme necessitating anticompetitive conduct." The
courts generally have applied this standard strictly. For example,
45
in Travelers Insurance Co. v. Blue Cross of Western Pennsylvania
one insurer sued another for allegedly monopolizing hospital coverage in the state. The defendant argued that it was immune from the
antitrust laws because its activities were regulated by the state
insurance department pursuant to a legislative enactment. The district court rejected this defense on the ground that the state statute
did not specifically sanction the anticompetitive conduct.
The second test used by the courts is whether the state supervises the anticompetitive activity." Generally, for anticompetitive
activity to warrant immunity, a state agency must have the power
to monitor the practices of the private entities engaged in the
activity. This requirement insures continual state involvement in
the questioned regulation." The courts have reached divergent
views on the requisite amount of state supervision. Gas Light Co.
41. In fact, the Court has denied certiorari in a number of cases in which the immunity
was raised. See, e.g., Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 444 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1047 (1972); Gas Light Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 440 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1062; George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d
25 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Lanier, 361 F.2d 870 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 930 (1966).
42. See, e.g., George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25,
30-31 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970); Asheville Bd. of Trade, Inc. v. FTC, 263
F.2d 502, 509 (4th Cir. 1959); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Blue Cross of Western Pennsylvania, 298
F. Supp. 1109, 1111-12 (W.D. Pa. 1969). This criterion apparently is derived from the Court's
statement in Parker that the program there received "its authority and efficacy from the
legislative command of the state." 317 U.S. at 350.
43. See Comment, Antitrust Immunity: State Action Protection Under Parker v.
Brown, 7 U.S.F.L. REV. 453, 477 (1973).
44. Comment, supra note 29, at 1164, 1217.
45. 298 F. Supp. 1109 (W.D. Pa. 1969).
46. See, e.g., Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 497 F.2d 1, 6 (4th Cir. 1974); Gas Light
Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 440 F.2d 1135, 1140 (5th Cir. 1971); Washington Gas Light Co. v.
Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 438 F.2d 248, 251 (4th Cir. 1970); George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v.
Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25, 30 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970).
47. Comment, supra note 29, at 1220.
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v. Georgia Power Co.4" states the prevailing view. In that case, a
natural gas company brought an antitrust suit against certain electric companies whose rates and practices were regulated by the state
public service commission. The Fifth Circuit held that anticompetitive activities are immune only if they are subject "to meaningful
regulation to the end that they are the result of the considered
judgment of the state regulatory authority."4 9 The court found the
active supervision requirement was met in this case because the
state public service commission had held hearings on the very practices in question." The Fourth Circuit took a much different approach in a similar fact situation in Washington Gas Light Co. v.
Virginia Electric & Power Co. 51 The court in that case examined the
regulatory control exercised by the state corporation commission
over certain corporate utility activities. Although the plaintiffs
argued that the commission had given no affirmative approval to
the defendant's activities, the court granted immunity, finding that
the commission could have stopped the alleged illegal conduct.2 By
inferring that silence may be interpreted as consent or approval, the
court suggested that the supervision requirement may be met so
long as anticompetitive activity is theoretically subject to the con53
trol of a regulatory body.
B.

Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar

The controversy in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar arose when
plaintiffs contracted to buy a home in Fairfax County, Virginia. The
lender financing the purchase required them to obtain title insurance, which necessitated a title examination by a member of the
state bar. Because they could not obtain the examination for less
than the rate prescribed in the minimum fee schedule published by
the Fairfax County Bar Association,"4 the Goldfarbs brought a class
action alleging that the schedule, as applied to fees for legal services
48. 440 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1971). See also George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool
Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25 (1st Cir.) cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970).
49. 440 F.2d at 1140.
50. Id.
51. 438 F.2d 248 (4th Cir. 1970).
52. Id. at 252.
53. Comment, supra note 43, at 459.
54. In 1962 the State Bar published a minimum-fee-schedule report that listed a series
of fees for legal services. The report stated that the fees were not mandatory, and it recommended only that the State Bar consider adopting such a schedule. Shortly thereafter, the
County Bar adopted its own fee schedule, and the suggested fees for title examination were
virtually identical to those in the State Bar report. 421 U.S. at 777 n.4.
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relating to residential real estate transactions, violated the antitrust
laws. The Goldfarbs also joined the Virginia State Bar as defendants. arguing that its ethical opinions enforced the fee schedule
because under them disciplinary action could be brought against
5
lawyers who did not abide by them. 1
On petition for certiorari, the Supreme Court first found that
since the minimum fee schedule set a rigid price floor and was not
purely advisory, it constituted price-fixing in direct contravention
of section 1" of the Sherman Act. 5 Thus, the fee schedule would
violate the Act unless they were exempt.
The Court dismissed the defendants' original contention that
the legal profession is exempt from the Sherman Act under a
"learned profession" doctrine. 8 The Court found no such exception
contained in the Act itself and recognized that a heavy presumption
exists against implicit exceptions. 9 Although acknowledging that
Federal Baseball, Raladam, and Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers had
implied that the practice of a learned profession is not "trade or
commerce,""e the Court recognized that the issue had been expressly
left open in National Association of Real Estate Boards and
American Medical Association." Declaring that the nature of an
occupation standing alone does not provide immunity from the
Sherman Act,12 the Court then specifically held that the learned
professions enjoy no total exclusion from antitrust regulation. The
Court did realize that the professions are distinguishable from other
business enterprises because of the aspect of public service, but
found that no such public interest basis supported minimum fee
schedules. 3 With this possible exemption removed, the Court found
55. The Virginia State Bar's most recent ethical opinion on point states that "evidence
that an attorney habitually charges less than the suggested minimum fee schedule adopted
by his local bar association, raises a presumption that such lawyer is guilty of misconduct
." Virginia State Bar Committee on Legal Ethics, Opinion No. 170, May 28, 1971, as cited
in 421 U.S. at 777. In fact, the parties stipulated that these opinions are a substantial
influencing factor in lawyers' adherence to the fee schedules. 421 U.S. at 778 n.6.
56. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970); see notes 4, 5, & 37 supra.
57. See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
58. The defendants also contended that the restraints on legal services created by the
schedule did not have a sufficient effect on interstate commerce to support jurisdiction under
the Sherman Act. The Court, however, concluded that "given the substantial volume of
commerce involved and the inseparability of this particular legal service from the interstate
aspects of real estate transactions," the schedule sufficiently affected interstate commerce.
421 U.S. at 785.
59. Id. at 787; see notes 6 & 7 supra and accompanying text.
60. 421 U.S. at 786 n.15; see text accompanying notes 8-16 supra.
61. 421 U.S. at 786 n.15; see notes 23 & 28 supra and accompanying text.
62. 421 U.S. 787, citing Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 7 (1945).
63. 421 U.S. at 786.
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a title examination specifically included in section 1 of the Act as
no more than the sale of a service. 4 The Court then declared: "We
intimate no view on any other situation than the one with which we
are confronted today."65
The Court then adopted the standards formulated by some
lower courts" and held that neither the county nor the state bar
association was entitled to state action immunity. In reaching this
result, the Court examined the relationship between both bar associations and the State of Virginia. Through its legislature the state
had authorized the Virginia Supreme Court to regulate the practice
of law. That court had adopted ethical codes dealing in part with
fees, but which explicitly directed that lawyers were not to be controlled by fee schedules.6 8 The Court then inquired whether state
policy mandated the fee schedules, and finding no statute or ethical
code that directed a price floor, held this requirement unfulfilled.
The Court next considered the supervisory role of the state Supreme
Court, noting that it had granted the State Bar the power to issue
ethical opinions. Since there was no indication that the state Supreme Court had approved those opinions, particularly the opinion
dealing with fee schedules, 6 the Court denied the immunity. The
Court therefore concluded that in this case the bar associations had
joined in essentially private anticompetitive activities.6
C.

Comment

In finding that minimum fee schedules violated the antitrust
laws, the Supreme Court in Goldfarb acted consistently with prior
authority. The "learned profession" doctrine could not be considered persuasive since it rested on dicta substantially weakened by
later cases. The Court wisely struck down the doctrine, because,
even assuming that special considerations are involved in professional activities, this does not justify a blanket exemption from
antitrust regulation. As two commentators suggest, the self-interest
involved in self-regulation, even by professional groups, demands
some governmental supervision.71 The Court also correctly applied
64. 421 U.S. at 787; see text accompanying note 29 supra.
65. Id. at 788 n.17.
66. See text accompanying notes 42-53 supra.
67. VA. CODE ANN. § 54-48 (1972); Button v. Day, 204 Va. 547, 132 S.E.2d 292 (1963).
68. Rules for Integration of the Virginia State Bar, 171 Va. xvii, xxiii (1938), as cited
in 421 U.S. at 789 n.19.
69. See note 55 supra.
70. 421 U.S. at 791-92.
71. See Ferren & Snyder, note 1 supra, at 732.
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the Parker doctrine in finding fee schedules not immune under the
state action doctrine, because minimum fees were neither enacted
by the State legislature nor adopted by the Virginia Supreme Court.
In applying the stricter requirement that such approval be actively
manifested rather than inferred from silence, 72 the Court acted consistently with the rationale that express state policy must sanction
anticompetitive conduct before a measure warrants exemption.
The Court's abolition of minimum fee schedules seems correct
from a policy standpoint as well, because these systems have had
an adverse economic impact upon consumer access to the legal serv-73
ices market. Assuming that the demand for legal services is elastic,

when lawyers raise their fees to comply with schedules they are
likely to reduce the total quantity of services that potential consumers are willing to purchase. 74 Minimum fees inhibit consumers especially with regard to preventive legal services; because higher fees
make it less probable that legal counselling will be judged worth its
cost, consumers may forego consulting a lawyer until they find
themselves in predicaments requiring more expensive patch-up
legal assistance. 75 The exceptions to these harmful effects of pricefixing only point out serious inequities. Corporate and wealthy
clients remain relatively unaffected by fee schedules because fees in
the large commercial practice are generally well above the minimum floor. One may argue that fee schedules also have no effect on
the very poor because of the availability of various free legal services. The result is that by setting prices above the market equilibrestricted the demand of
rium, minimum fees have most directly
7
lower and middle income persons.
The elimination of fee schedules will not alleviate these problems entirely, however, since other anticompetitive regulations also
restrict access to legal services. The bar and the courts limit the
supply of services by controlling entrance into the profession and
defining what tasks can be performed only by duly admitted members. The prohibition of advertising and solicitation similarly decreases demand by denying consumers information about legal serv72. See text accompanying notes 42-53 supra.
73. See note 168 infra and accompanying text.
74. See Note, A CriticalAnalysis of Bar Association Minimum Fee Schedules, 85 H~Av.
L. REv. 971, 976, 980 (1972).
75. Id. at 980; see B. CHRISTENSEN, LAWYERS FOR PEOPLE OF MODERATE MEANS 10, 23, 40
(1970) [hereinafter cited as CHRISTENSEN].
76. Ferren & Snyder, supra note 1, at 733-34; see CHRISTENSEN, supra note 75, at 18-39;
Note, supra note 74, at 980.
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ices.77 The advertising ban especially weakens the effect of Goldfarb
because the price competition theoretically fostered by the abolition
of minimum fees will mean little if consumers have insufficient
information about fees to take advantage of it. Therefore, until
these restrictions are removed the elimination of fee schedules will
have a diluted effect.
The Goldfarb decision most likely will not affect the validity of
these other anticompetitive restrictions. The Court carefully limited
its holding to the invalidation of fee schedules,78 and its reasoning
seems equally limited in application. In dismissing the "learned
profession" exemption, the Court held only that the professions
enjoy no complete exclusion from the antitrust laws; it also expressly stated that it intimated no opinion concerning the application of the Sherman Act in other contexts where the public interest
aspect of a restriction is more readily apparent. Because minimum
fees served primarily as a regulation of the business aspects of the
profession, Goldfarb might be distinguished under the Marjorie
Webster doctrine79 as subjecting to the antitrust laws only restrictions with a commercial purpose. The Court might find in a later
case that bar admission and advertising restrictions enjoy a closer
nexus to the ethical standards of the profession and have an essentially noncommercial purpose. The Court's denial of state action
immunity to fee schedules also appears limited to the instant facts.
While minimum fees typically have been adopted solely by the bar
without state authorization, 0 bar admissions are controlled in each
state by statute or court rule.' Similarly, the bar's prohibition of
advertising and solicitation has been directly adopted by state supreme courts as part of the Code of Professional Responsibility.2
Since they have been directly compelled by the states, these other
restrictions do not suffer the defects that invalidated minimum fee
schedules.
I.

FEE ADvERTISING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

Because of its impact upon the delivery of legal services, the
prohibition of advertising by lawyers83 has caused increasing first
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Ferren & Snyder, supra note 1, at 733-34.
See note 65 supra and accompanying text.
See text accompanying notes 33-35 supra.
See Ferren & Snyder, supra note 1, at 732.
See Annot., 144 A.L.R. 150 (1943).
82. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONsIBILIrY, DISCIPLINARY RULES 2-101, 2-103 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as DISCIPLINARY RULES].
83. DISCIPLINARY RULES 2-101 to 2-105.
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amendment controversy"4 centering around the specific restrictions
on fee advertising. Defenders of the advertising ban contend that
legal advertising receives no first amendment protection because it
is freely regulable "commercial speech." Opponents counter that
present restrictions on fee advertising infringe upon the rights of
consumers to receive information and associate for purposes of obtaining legal services. The controversy has recently fostered litigation and has resulted in bar association proposals to relax the advertising ban. Resolution of the controversy over the legality of advertising restrictions is important to the legal services market, and
especially to the consumers who claim direct harm caused by the
prohibition.
A.

Legal Background

Most commentators trace the origins of the prohibitions on
legal advertising to the "fraternal" conditions under which barristers practiced in 19th century England 5 and the historical opposition to "stirring up litigation."8 6 Although restrictions upon advertising were first imposed by American bar associations between 1887
and 1906,11 in 1908 more stringent prohibitions were incorporated
into Canon 27 of the Canons of Professional Ethics, which stated
that advertisements for professional employment were reprehensible as offending the traditions of the profession. 8 These restrictions
arose in response to fears that the profession was becoming excessively commercialized.8 9 In 1970 the ABA Code of Professional Re84. Restrictions upon professional advertising generally are upheld against due process
challenges. See, e.g., North Dakota State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc., 414
U.S. 156 (1973); Semler v. Oregon State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608 (1935).
Similarly, bar association prohibitions upon advertising also appear to fall under the state
action immunity to the antitrust laws since they are adopted directly by state supreme courts.
See text accompanying note 81 supra.
85. Lawyers were then members of a select fraternity that worked in a commercial
atmosphere. The prohibition of advertising was one of the rules of etiquette important to the
profession because competitive conduct was viewed as "ungentlemanly." See H. DRINKER,
LEGAL ETHICS 210 (1953).
86. See P. WINFIELD, HISTORY OF CONSPIRACY AND ABUSE OF LEGAL PROCEDURE 142-45
(1921); Note, Advertising, Solicitation and the Profession'sDuty to Make Legal Counsel
Available, 81 YALE L.J. 1181 (1972).
87. See H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 23 (1953).

88. ABA

CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL

ETHICS No. 27.

89. One commentator suggests, however, that the Canons may have been used as a
means for upper-class metropolitan lawyers to exclude effectively the urban poor, immigrants, and blue-collar workers from the profession. The advertising ban especially was suited
to discriminate against lower income lawyers who could not afford to wait passively for
clients. See J. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE 40-43 (1976).
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sponsibility supplanted the Canons, but reaffirmed the advertising
ban by prohibiting all forms of "public advertising.""0 Exceptions
to the ban are very limited-to professional cards and announcements, stationery letterheads, telephone listings, and certified reputable law lists-and do not include the advertising of attorneys'
fees. Bar associations base the current restrictions upon several
grounds. First, they argue that forms of competitive advertising
necessary to most commercial enterprises would lessen the dignity
of the profession. Secondly, members of the profession express concern that open advertising would "stir up" undesirable litigation.'
Thirdly, it is contended that unrestricted advertising might lead to
the neglect of clients' interests. 2 Finally, the bar contends that the
advertising ban is necessary to prevent misrepresentation and overreaching by lawyers. 3 Defenders of the bar's position find advertising restrictions consistent with first amendment freedoms of expression under the commercial speech doctrine. The commercial speech
doctrine emerged from Valentine v. Chrestensen,4 a 1942 case in
which the United States Supreme Court distinguished between
"information and opinion" and "purely commercial advertising."
Chrestensen sought to enjoin enforcement of a municipal ordinance
prohibiting the distribution of advertising handbills on the streets.
In reversing a grant of the injunction, the Court found the distribution of Chrestensen's circular to constitute commercial activity unprotected by the first amendment.15 Later commentators have interpreted the decision as holding that commercial advertising necessarily falls outside the first amendment. 8 Although Chrestensen
90. DISCIPLINARY RULE 2-101(B) provides that a lawyer may not publicize the availability of his legal services "through newspaper or magazine advertisements, radio or television
announcements, display advertisements in city or telephone directories, or other means of
commercial publicity."
91. See notes 160-62 infra and accompanying text.
92. See notes 163 & 164 infra and accompanying text.
93. See notes 165 & 166 infra and accompanying text.
94. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
95. The Court's holding actually is quite limited. Chrestensen had attempted to avoid
the ordinance by appending to his handbill a statement of alleged public interest, and the
Court based its holding on this intent. Id. at 55. It did not elaborate on the applicability of
its decision beyond the situation in which one includes traditionally protected speech on an
advertisement solely to avoid regulation of the advertisement. See Note, Commercial
Speech-An End in Sight to Chrestensen?, 23 DEPAUL L. REv. 1258, 1263 (1974).
96. The commercial speech doctrine is based on the Court's statement that:
. . .the streets are proper places for the exercise of the freedom of communicating
information and disseminating opinion and that, though the states and municipalities
may appropriately regulate the privilege in the public interest, they may not unduly
burden or proscribe its employment in these public thoroughfares. We are equally clear
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enunciated no practical standard for determining when speech is
considered commercial, the Court in subsequent cases developed a
"primary purpose" test that predicated protection on whether com97
mercial gain constituted the chief motivation for the speech.
The primary purpose test proved deficient," however, and the
Court replaced it with a standard which inquired whether the content of a challenged advertisement conveyed protected material regardless of the motive behind it. In New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan9 the defendants had submitted a partially false advertisement to the Times describing Southern civil rights activities, criticizing public authorities of certain Southern communities, and soliciting contributions to the civil rights cause. Sullivan, the Commissioner of Public Affairs of Montgomery, Alabama, brought a
libel suit against the Times as publishers of the advertisement,
contending that the advertisement constituted commercial speech
not entitled to first amendment protection. The Court dismissed
this argument, holding that although the newspaper had been paid
to print the advertisement, the advertisement addressed an issue of
public controversy and did not fall within the category of "commercial speech."' 00 The Court again utlized the content standard in
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human
Relations,'"' in which it held sex-designated help-wanted advertisements unprotected as "classic examples of commercial speech."',"
Finding that the advertisements conveyed no editorial policy of the
newspaper, the Court reasoned that they were mere proposals of
possible employment more closely resembling the Chrestensencircular than the New York Times advertisement.10° The Court indithat the Constitution imposes no such restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising.
316 U.S. at 54 (emphasis added).
97. See, e.g., Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319
U.S. 105, 111 (1943); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 142-43 (1943); Jamison v.
Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 417 (1943).
98. The "primary purpose" test proved inadequate because of the Court's holdings that
even though newspapers, Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936), books,
Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 150 (1959), and movies, Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson,
343 U.S. 495, 501-02 (1952), are produced for the primary purpose of financial gain, they are
not excluded from first amendment protection. See Note, note 95 supra, at 1266-67.
99. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
100. The Court found that the advertisement "communicated information, expressed
opinion, recited grievances, protested claimed abuses, and sought financial support on behalf
of a movement whose existence and objectives are matters of the highest public interest and
concern." Id. at 266.
101. 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
102. Id. at 385.
103. Id.
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cated, however, that it did not hold that commercial speech warrants no first amendment protection; rather, it expressly left open
the issue of first amendment protection where the advertising is
not complicated by such illegal activity as sex discrimination. The
Court did suggest that the proper approach would involve a weighing of the first amendment interest served by advertising an ordinary commercial proposal against the governmental interest supporting the regulation of that advertising."4
The Supreme Court significantly altered the scope of the commercial speech doctrine in Bigelow v. Virginia."' Bigelow was convicted of publishing newspaper advertisements of abortion services
in violation of a state statute. Because the advertisements provided
information essential to potential consumers of these services, the
case presented an opportunity for the Court to expand upon its
statement in Pittsburgh Press that commercial advertising may
serve protected first amendment interests like those of consumers.
Instead of expanding on that statement, the Court relied upon the
content standard of the commercial speech doctrine and, finding
that the advertisements in question conveyed "factual material of
public interest" to persons other than consumers of abortion services,'"' reversed the conviction. Clearly the abortion advertisements
in Bigelow did not resemble the type of editorial statement validated in New York Times'017 and found lacking in Pittsburgh
Press;0 1 rather, any public interest content was only incidental to
the primarily commercial content. Thus the Bigelow Court apparently extended the content standard to include within the first
amendment's protection any advertising containing material of alleged public concern. The probable result is wider first amendment
104. Id. at 389.
105. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
106. The Court stated that:
The advertisement published in appellant's newspaper did more than simply propose a
commercial transaction. . . . Portions of its message, most prominently the lines,
"Abortions are now legal in New York. There are no residency requirements," involve
the exercise of the freedom of communicating information and disseminating opinion.
Viewed in its entirety, the advertisement conveyed information of potential interest
and value to a diverse audience-not only to readers possibly in need of the services
offered, but also to those with a general curiosity about, or genuine interest in, the
subject matter of the law of another State and its development, and to readers seeking
reform in Virginia.
Id. at 822.
107. See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
108. See text accompanying note 13 supra.
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protection to those conveying information and opinion in the form
of advertising.
Although the first amendment has long included the right to
disseminate information and opinions, the development of a right
to receive these communications is relatively new. Logically, such
a right seems grounded in the first amendment, since the freedom
of speech would be of little value without a corresponding right to
hear the speech.' 9 A right to receive information first appeared in
Martin v. Struthers,"0 in which the Supreme Court invalidated an
ordinance that prohibited ringing doorbells or knocking on doors of
residences in order to distribute handbills because it violated the
freedoms of speech and press. Although concerned with the rights
of the distributor in this case, the Court noted in dicta that these
rights were complemented by the willing listeners' right to receive
the leaflets."' The Court subsequently has seemed to recognize a
right to receive information in conjunction with the rights of privacy," 2 obscenity," 3 and prisoners."' The Supreme Court first directly confronted the right to receive information in Kleindienst v.
Mandel,"5 in which the Attorney General had refused to issue a visa
to Mandel, a Belgian Marxist who sought to enter the country to
deliver a series of lectures. Those to whom Mandel intended to
speak successfully sought declaratory relief in district court on the
ground that the statutes authorizing the Attorney General's actions
unconstitutionally abridged the right to receive information."' The
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the federal government's interest in excluding aliens outweighed the plaintiffs' right to hear
Mandel." 7 Since the Court treated the right to receive information
as it would have any other first amendment interest by balancing
the right against the countervailing governmental interest, Mandel
109. See Comment, The Right to Receive and the Commercial Speech Doctrine: New
ConstitutionalConsiderations,63 GEo. L.J. 775, 777-78 (1975).
110. 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
111. Id. at 143.
112. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482-83 (1965) (statute prohibiting dissemination of information about contraceptives unconstitutional).
113. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (statute prohibiting possession of
obscene materials unconstitutional).
114. Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 850 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S.
817, 827-28, 834 (1974) (prison rules prohibiting face-to-face interviews between inmates and
the press constitutional); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 409 (1974) (censorship of
prisoners' mail unconstitutional).
115. 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
116. Mandel v. Mitchell, 325 F. Supp. 620, 631 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
117. 408 U.S. at 769-70.
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evidences the Court's willingness to include the right in the first
amendment.
Two lower courts have explicitly recognized a first amendment
right to receive information. In Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc. v. State Board of Pharmacy"8 consumer organizations and individual consumers challenged the constitutionality of a state statute
prohibiting licensed pharmacists from publishing or advertising the
price of prescription drugs. The state board of pharmacy contended
that it could regulate such advertising under the commercial speech
doctrine, 9 but the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
rejected this argument because the rights of consumers, not pharmacists, were being asserted.'20 The court then held that the statute
infringed upon consumers' "right to know" the prices of drugs so as
to facilitate careful shopping.' 2' The Supreme Court has noted jurisdiction to review this decision, and its ultimate result will have
great impact upon the development of the right to receive information.'2 2 A district court in California reached the same result in
Terry v. California State Board of Pharmacy.'2 3 After considering
claims advanced by the state to justify the restrictions upon prescription drug advertising, such as the likelihood that price information would mislead consumers and lower the standards of the profession, the court held:
It is clear that the state has legitimate interests in controlling artificial
demand for prescription drugs, preventing misleading advertising, maintain118. 373 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Va. 1974), aff'd, 96 S.Ct. 1817 (1976).
119. The board based its argument on a prior federal court decision which had upheld
the statute. Id. at 685; see Patterson Drug Co. v. Kingery, 305 F. Supp. 821, 825 (W.D. Va.
1969).
120. Thus, reasoned the court, its action was "not an intrusion upon the State's regulation of pharmacies." 373 F. Supp. at 686.
121. Id. at 686-87.
122. 420 U.S. 971 (1975). On May 24, 1976, the Supreme Court affirmed the district
court's opinion. 96 S. Ct. 1817 (1976). Relying on Kleindienst v. Mandel, the Court initially
determined that the plaintiffs had a first amendment right to receive information. Explicitly
overruling Valentine v. Chrestensen, the Court then found that purely commercial advertising was entitled to first amendment protection. Observing that the advertising bar did not
affect professional standards directly, the Court determined that the plaintiff's interest in
receiving drug price information outweighed the state's interest in maintaining a high degree
of professionalism on the part of licensed pharmacists, and held the statute unconstitutional.
In reaching this decision, the Court attempted to limit its impact on bar rules prohibiting
fee advertising by noting that states may prohibit false or misleading advertising and suggesting in a footnote a distinction between standardized products and professional services.
According to the Court, the infinite variety and nature of professional services enhances the
possibility for confusion and deception and thus increases the state's interest in prohibiting
certain kinds of advertising by lawyers. Id. at 1831 n.25.
123. 395 F. Supp. 94 (1975), aff'd, 44 U.S.L.W. 3698 (U.S. June 8, 1976).
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ing professional standards, and preventing forgery of prescriptions. Even assuming that this Court found them to be compelling, the statute challenged
could not stand because the statute only minimally advances the interests
asserted, and in any event does not do so by the means least restrictive of the
124
plaintiffs' burdened First Amendment freedoms.

Thus in situations analogous to the advertising of attorneys' fees,
federal courts have utilized the right to receive information to vindicate the interests of consumers in obtaining price information.
Beyond a right possessed by all consumers to receive information, several Supreme Court cases suggest special treatment for
consumers of legal services based on a right of association for purposes of obtaining representation. In NAACP v. Button 21 the Court
struck down a state statute imposing ethical prohibitions on solicitation of suits against segregated school districts, finding that "a
State may not, under the guise of prohibiting professional misconduct, ignore constitutional rights." 2 ' The Court held that the activities of the NAACP, its affiliates, and members were constitutionally
protected modes of expression which a state may not prohibit under
its power to regulate the legal profession.1n The Court also ruled in
favor of the communication of information on legal services in
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State
Bar,12 in which it declared that the railroad union could advise
injured members and their dependents to obtain legal assistance
and could recommend specific lawyers. Stressing the legal ignorance
of laymen, the Court upheld their right to associate and assist one
another to preserve and enforce legal rights. 129 In two later decisions,
UMW, District 12 v. Illinois State Bar Association3 ' and United
TransportationUnion v. State Bar,3 ' the Court also upheld union
activity aimed at assisting members' assertion of claims. In United
Transportationthe Court, relying on its earlier opinions in Button
and Railroad Trainmen, declared that "collective activity undertaken to obtain meaningful access to the courts is a fundamental
right within the protection of the First Amendment."' 312
124. Id. at 106.
125. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
126. Id. at 439.
127. Id. at 428-29.
128. 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
129. Id. at 7.
130. 389 U.S. 217 (1967). The union had employed a lawyer on a salaried basis to
represent workmen's compensation cases.
131. 401 U.S. 576 (1971). The union recommended selected attorneys to represent them
in F.E.L.A. damage suits, while limiting the fees that those attorneys could charge such
members.
132. Id. at 585.
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Recent Developments

Recently the Justice Department, individual attorneys and
consumer groups have filed several suits 133 in state and federal district courts challenging the constitutionality of bar regulations prohibiting fee advertising. 134 In Consumers Union of United States,
Inc. v. ABA 135 plaintiffs, nonprofit consumer organizations,' attempted to publish a directory of all lawyers residing or practicing
in Arlington County, Virginia. Since the directory would publish
information concerning fees prohibited by Disciplinary Rule 2102(A) (6) of the ABA and State Bar Codes of Professional Responsibility, 37 plaintiffs sought certification by the ABA.3 8 Following assurances that the ABA would disapprove the directory 3 9 and warnings by the state bar that lawyers allowing themselves to be listed
in the directory would face disciplinary proceedings, "' plaintiffs
133. See, e.g., United States v. ABA, Civil No. 76-1182 (D.D.C., filed June 25, 1976);
Person v. Association of the Bar of City of New York, Civil No. 75-6-987 (E.D.N.Y., filed June
23, 1975); Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. ABA, Civil No. 75-0105-R (E.D. Va.,
filed Feb. 27, 1975); Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. State Bar, Civil No. C-752385 SC (filed Nov. 13, 1975); Hirschkop v. Virginia State Bar, Civil No. 74-0243 (E.D. Va.,
filed May 23, 1974).
134. DISCIPLINARY RuLEs 2-101, 2-102. These rules have been adopted in 49 states.
135. Civil No. 75-0105-R (E.D. Va., filed Feb. 27, 1975).
136. Plaintiffs are Consumers Union, a nonprofit membership consumer organization,
and Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, a statewide nonprofit consumer organization.
137. The directory would publish information about the fees and billing practices of
individual lawyers. The information on fees would range from the hourly billing rate to the
average foe charged for a number of common, relatively routine and uncomplicated legal
services such as a change of name, individual bankruptcy, representation of complainant in
an uncontested divorce, and closing and settlement of a single-family home. Brief for Plaintiff
at 4, Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. ABA, Civil No. 75-0105-R (E.D. Va., filed
Feb. 27, 1975) [hereinafter cited as Plaintiff's Briefl.
138. DISCIPLINARY RULE 2-102(A)(6) (as amended Feb. 17, 1976) prohibits lawyers from
disseminating information about themselves in "law lists or legal directory" listings other
than those permitted by subsection (6), which provides that a law list must be "reputable"
and may give "brief biographical and other informative data." Subsection (6) further provides: "The published data may include only the following. . . ." (emphasis added). It then
lists various categories of information. The State Bar rule is in all material respects identical
to the rule promulgated by the ABA. ABA interpretations with respect to compliance with
the rule by law lists or directories have been adopted by the State Bar.
139. DISCIPLINARY RULE 2-102(A)(6) provides that certification by the ABA conclusively
establishes that a law list is "reputable" and in compliance with ABA rules and standards.
While the rule technically does not require certification before publication of a law list, state
bars rely on noncertification by the ABA to find legal directories improper. See Plaintiff's
Brief at 5, 68. Thus few lawyers cooperate with a legal directory that does not have a certificate.
140. After a formal request by a member of the State Bar concerning the appropriateness of allowing herself to be listed in the directory, the Legal Ethics Committee of the State
Bar unanimously ruled that since the ABA had not issued a certificate, lawyers listing themselves in the Consumers Union directory would violate DR 2-102(A)(6).
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filed suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Plaintiffs alleged
that Rule 2-102(A)(6) prevents Arlington County lawyers from providing information to or allowing themselves to be listed in the
directory. According to the plaintiffs such a restriction constitutes
a prior restraint on the plaintiffs' and its members' first amendment
rights to gather, publish, convey, and receive information necessary
to secure the most effective and satisfactory legal representation.'
Following a continuance to allow the ABA to modify its position,
arguments were heard on May 18, and a decision is expected shortly.
In response to the Consumers Union suit and pressures from the
Justice Department,' the ABA has begun considering proposals to
allow limited fee advertising. In December, 1975, the ABA's Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility released
a discussion draft of proposed amendments to the Code of Professional Responsibility which would have allowed lawyers and law
firms to place certain advertisements in newspapers and on radio
and television.4 3 The committee's proposals limited information
concerning fees to a statement of a standard consultation fee, a
range of fees for specific types of legal services, and the availability
of credit arrangements."' After receiving comments from the bar
and public the committee substantially revised its initial proposals.
Deferring action on the proposal allowing advertising by individual
lawyers, the committee's report to the ABA House of Delegates
recommended limited changes in ethical rules' to allow bona fide
consumer organizations to publish general biographical information, charges for an initial consultation fee and information on the
area of law practice concentration.' At its February meeting the
House of Delegates rejected the standing committee's recommendation by restricting the dissemination of fee information to ABAcertified law lists, legal directories, and the yellow pages of telephone directories.'4 7 Since most telephone companies disallow pub141.

Plaintiffs Brief at 10, 12.

142. See Address by Joseph Sims, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division of the U.S. Dept. of Justice, ABA Conference on Lawyer Advertising, December 6, 1975;
Address by Bruce B. Wilson, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division of the
U.S. Dept. of Justice, Philadelphia Bar Association Special Briefing Conference on Ethical
and Economic Aspects of Legal Fees, December 12, 1975.
143. Discussion Draft, Proposed Amendments to Ethical Considerations and Disciplinary Rules of Canon 2 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, December 6, 1975, at 3.
144. Id. at 2, 3.
145. The standing committee's recommendations would have amended DR 2-102(A) (6),
2-105, and EC 2-14.
146. STANDING COMMrIrEE ON ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, REPORT TO THE
HOUSE OF DELEGATES (1976).

147. ABA Amendments to Canon 2 of the Code of Professional Responsibility Approved
by the House of Delegates, February 17, 1976. Under the amendments the information could
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lication of specific price information 4 ' however, the delegates' substitution of the yellow pages for consumer directories as a permissible media is of limited utility. Because of the inadequacy of the
ABA's response,'49 consumer groups and the Justice Department
have indicated their intention to press forward with litigation; 5 '
thus, it appears that the question of restrictions on fee advertising
will be resolved by the federal courts.
C.

Comment

Synthesis of the Supreme Court's first amendment decisions
indicates that advertising of attorneys' fees should receive constitutional protection. Because fee advertising would typically contain
no editorial statements on issues of public controversy, the commercial speech doctrine as utilized in New York Times and Pittsburgh
Press would not require first amendment protection. Under the
relaxed content standard applied in Bigelow, however, advertising
of attorneys' fees might be protected as conveying factual information of public interest. Given the public's pervasive distrust and
only be published in a format approved by individual bar associations. Several states including Tennessee and Virginia have already rejected the ABA proposals. In recently disapproving
a petition by the State Bar to award the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia to conform
to the ABA standards, the court stated that "the proposed amendments . . . will not serve
the best interests of the public or the legal profession." 44 U.S.L.W. 2508 (May 4, 1976).
148. 44 U.S.L.W. 1129 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1976).
149. The California State Bar has taken an alternative approach. The State Board
Committee on Professional Responsibility recently approved publication of a proposed program for comment by the bar and public that provides for a two-year study to be conducted
by an outside consultant to determine the effects of different kinds of advertising on increasing access to legal services, on the legal system, and on costs to the consumers of legal services.
The study would be conducted in four demographically typical counties. During the two-year
study period one county would have the Rules of Professional Responsibility that prohibit
advertising suspended with federal agencies and the State Bar having jurisdiction over false
and misleading advertising. A program of limited advertising would be allowed in a second
county. Included would be such proposals as ads in the yellow pages, legal directories and
possibly classified sections of newspapers. In a third county, bar associations would be encouraged to publicize lawyer referral services operating in the county. In all other counties
the present rules of Professional Responsibility would continue without modification. A
fourth demographically typical county among these would be designated as a "control
county." Letter from David S. Casey, President of California Bar Association, to all local bar
association presidents, March 5, 1976.
150. Wall Street J., Feb. 18, 1976, at 6 col. 2. On June 25, 1976 the Justice Department
filed suit against the ABA challenging its prohibition of fee advertising or antitrust and first
amendment grounds. In its complaint the Justice Department charges that the advertising
prohibition restrains price competition among lawyers and deprives persons needing legal
services the opportunity to obtain information about their cost and availability. According
to the Justice Department the advertising prohibition also prevents lawyers from making
legal services more readily available through the development and advertising of legal clinics
and pre-paid legal plans. Shifrin, U.S. Sues Bar Association on Lawyer Advertising Ban,
Washington Post, June 26, 1976, at 4, col. 1.
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misunderstanding of lawyers' fees,' 5 recitation of general ranges of
fees for various legal services might enlighten consumers about the
mechanics of the system of justice. Thus the educational benefits
of direct lawyer advertising could extend to many persons other
than those presently in need of legal services. Furthermore, the first
amendment freedom to communicate necessarily includes fee listing in consumer-promulgated law directories such as the one in issue
in Consumers Union. These directories do not constitute advertising
in the conventional sense, because they seek to list all attorneys,
contain no self-laudatory statements, and are not paid for by the
lawyers themselves; rather, such directory advertisements are
purely informational.
Even if the advertising of attorneys' fees fails to meet the
Bigelow content standard, the commercial speech doctrine may
nonetheless be overridden by the rights of consumers of legal services. The Supreme Court suggested this conclusion in its Pittsburgh
Press statement that even "ordinary commercial proposals" may
serve protected first amendment interests.' 52 A policy basis exists for
this premise: the states' justification for regulating commercial advertising-the protection of consumers from false and misleading
statements-loses much of its force when the consumers themselves
assert first amendment rights.'53 The district court in Virginia Citizens Consumer Council employed this reasoning in finding that
consumers' right to know prescription drug prices outweighed the
commercial speech doctrine."5 4 Given the similarity of the fact situations, the Supreme Court's imminent decision in Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council may predict the outcome of the question of legal
advertising. Although the latter involves the sale of services rather
than goods, this distinction should not be critical to the right to
receive issue.
Even assuming, however, that the Court upholds the advertising restrictions in Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, the prohibitions on legal advertising still may be challenged due to the special
rights accorded to consumers of legal services.'55 NAACP v. Button
and its progeny establish that group activity for the purposes of
obtaining counsel may fall within the shelter of the first amendment
as "constitutionally protected modes of expression."' 5 6 Law lists and
151. Studies reveal that many persons believe that lawyers' services are prohibitively
expensive, and are also unaware of the need and value of various services. See CHRiSTFNSEN,
supra note 75; E. Koos, THE FAMILY AND THE LAW 10 (1949); Comment, Bar Restrictions on
Disseminationof InformationAbout Legal Services, 22 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 483, 484 (1974).
152. See text accompanying note 104 supra.
153. See Comment, supra note 109, at 802.
154. See text accompanying notes 119 & 120 supra.
155. See text accompanying notes 125-32 supra.
156. 371 U.S. at 428-29.
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directories compiled by consumer groups such as the Consumers
Union in Virginia might be considered the product of just activity,
and arguably could merit protection under this rationale.
Although the advertising of attorneys' fees appears to fall
within the scope of the first amendment, it does not follow that
absolute protection is warranted. Rather, determining the constitutionality of an infringement upon first amendment freedoms requires a balancing of the state interests in regulation against the
first amendment rights in question.'. 7 The Supreme Court has
viewed such infringements with strict scrutiny, requiring that curtailment of first amendment freedoms be justified as necessary to a
compelling state interest. 5 ' In the context of legal advertising, the
states offer several justifications for restricting fee information. 5 9
First, concern exists that fee advertising would disturb the administration of justice by stirring up litigation.' 0 This "floodgates" argument seemingly has been largely refuted by Supreme Court statements that litigation serves social functions rather than having
harmful effects.'61 Furthermore, an advertising ban should not discourage legitimate claims merely to prevent frivolous actions. ' 2 Proponents of the advertising prohibition argue alternatively that by
competitively lowering prices and generating more business, fee information would foster neglect of clients' interests. It is equally
plausible, however, that these conditions might bring about an increase in efficiency that would in fact aid clients.'6 3 Nevertheless,
even assuming that some clients might be neglected as a consequence, malpractice and disciplinary actions exist as alternatives
less restrictive of the rights of consumers.'6 4 The third and most
often cited justification for the current restrictions is that fee information would create excessive competition that would in turn induce fraud, misrepresentation, and overreaching. It does not necessarily follow, however, that legal advertising leads to wholesale public deception; nor does any empirical data support this hypothesis.
In fact, it is arguable that lawyers are no more likely than other
sellers of goods and services to make false and deceptive state157. See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961).
158. See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963).
159. For a comprehensive analysis of the various state justifications for restricting advertising see Comment, supra note 151, at 508-15; Note, supra note 86, at 1187-91.
160. CHRISTENSEN, supra note 75, at 145.
161. Id. at 144-45; NAACP V. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); see Comment, supra note
151, at 511.
162. Comment, supra note 151, at 511.
163. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 347 (1972). Greater volume of business
would enable law firms to handle common types of services more efficiently and at lower
costs.
164. See Comment, supra note 42, at 510.
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ments.'65 If misrepresentation does occur, less restrictive sanctions

exist.' 6 ' Thus, although the states have a compelling interest in
protecting their citizens, it appears that advertising of attorneys'
fees poses little threat to the public that cannot be prevented by
other means. The present restrictions cannot be considered essential
or even reasonably related to promotion of this state end.
The countervailing interests of consumers in receiving fee information are perhaps best considered in terms of the harmful effects
of the present advertising restrictions.'67 The demand for legal services appears elastic, depending primarily upon the quality of service, its cost and accessibility, and public knowledge and attitudes
about the law, lawyers, and their services.'68 Were the public better
informed about various services' existence, value, and relative cost,
consumer demand would increase, especially for preventive legal
services.
The more unfortunate aspect of the public injury occasioned by
bans on legal advertising is the inequitable visitation of the injury.'69
Since they are relatively close to the legal profession, corporate and
wealthy consumers have sufficient information about the cost of
legal services without advertising; low-income persons are similarly
less affected because of access to publicized legal services offered by
legal clinics and public defenders. Middle-income consumers, however, are not so informed of legal services cost and are not eligible
for legal services to the indigent, and therefore bear the greatest
burden of ignorance enforced by the restrictions on advertising. Finally, the prohibition of fee advertising may tend to create the evil
it is designed to prevent, the overreaching of clients. Consumers who
are generally ignorant of fees commonly offered in the marketplace
are more likely to agree to fees that are actually excessive. Thus, the
restrictions on fee advertising inhibit consumer demand for legal
services by denying essential information. It is evident that the
consumer interest in obtaining this information far outweighs the
state interest in denying it.
Although the present broad restrictions on the advertising of
attorneys' fees appear invalid under the first amendment, the regulation of certain forms of fee advertising may be permissible. Despite the commercial speech doctrine, consumer-compiled law lists
and some direct lawyer advertising may fall within the first
amendment because they convey material of public interest.'70
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
12 (1956);
170.

See Plaintiff's Brief at 30.
See text accompanying note 55 supra.
CHRISTENSEN, supra note 75, at 20-26.
Note, supra note 86, at 1204.
See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S.
Note, supra note 86, at 1181.
See text following note 151 supra.
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Where fee information is disseminated in conjunction with competitive and self-laudatory statements, however, it may be unprotected
even under the relaxed Bigelow content standard, because such advertising would contain superfluous comments which could tend to
distort or dilute its informational value.' Even if the first amendment does protect this form of advertising, the state interest in
preventing it might outweigh the consumer interest in receiving it.
Fee information in the context of competitive advertising, especially
if communicated in the media, could raise unfounded expectations
of what services consumers will receive for their money. Besides
presenting dangers of misunderstanding, competitive fee advertising might act as a vehicle for fee misrepresentation where the services offered are unclear. Thus, state regulation of legal advertising
could be valid where fee information no longer serves consumers'
interests in having objective knowledge with which to make wise
decisions.
IV.

MAXIMUM CONTINGENT FEES BY COURT RULE

Courts traditionally have frowned upon contingent fee contracts because they give lawyers a financial interest in the outcome
of litigation. It is feared that the lawyer's self-interest in a lawsuit
might come between him and his client, not only with respect to the
amount of the fee but also with respect to the control of the suit on
such questions as whether to accept an offer of settlement. 7 2 To
prevent these possible abuses of the system and the exaction of
excessive fees, some courts and legislatures haveattempted limited
regulation of contingent fee agreements. At present, perhaps the
most far-reaching regulation is New Jersey Supreme Court Rule
1:21-7(c). This rule sets a graduated scale of maximum permissible
contingent fees in all tort litigation. The New Jersey court upheld
the rule in American Trial Lawyers Association v. New Jersey Supreme Court,'13 a decision which recognizes a broad judicial power
to regulate fees. If the court's reasoning is followed by other courts, 74
the decision may have a profound effect upon the economics of legal
services and the ability of persons to gain access to the judicial
system.

A. Legal Background
Although American courts generally uphold contingent fee con171. Memorandum from R. William Ide IIIto the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics
and Professional Responsibility, October 31, 1975.

172. F. MACKINNON, CONTINGENT FEES FOR LEGAL SERVICEs
as MACKINNON].
173.
174.

66 N.J. 258, 330 A.2d 350 (1974).
See note 221 infra.

5 (1964) [hereinafter cited
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tracts, two rationales have arisen permitting courts to scrutinize the
contracts' validity. 5 The first characterizes the relationship between attorney and client as fiduciary and permits judicial scrutiny
of fees on this theory. 7 The second places fee contracts within the
177
courts' disciplinary powers over attorneys practicing before them.
Under either theory, the fee must be reasonable. If a court finds a
contingent fee oppressive or unconscionable, it will hold the contract unenforceable.178 Since most courts limit their determinations
of reasonableness to the particular factual situation of the case presented, no specific standard for limiting fees has evolved from judicial decisions. Because the courts have declined to condemn any
specific percentage as unconscionable per se,1 71 this ad hoc analysis
has allowed fees as high as fifty percent of recovery.' 0
While most states do not regulate fees in general, many have
statutorily restricted fees in specific proceedings. 8 1 For example, a
majority of states regulate contingent fees in workmen's compensation actions, requiring approval of the fee by the compensation
board 2 or restricting the fee to a maximum percentage of recovery.' Congress has regulated the use of contingent fees in certain
actions against the United States.'1 For example, the Federal Tort
Claims Act'85 limits contingent fees to twenty-five percent of the
administrative settlement after commencement of court proceed175. For example, if a contingent fee contract has been obtained by fraud, mistake, or
undue influence the contract will be held invalid. S. SPEISER, ATTORNEYS' FEES § 2:9 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as SPEISER]. Prohibitions against contingent fee use are also found in
specific areas of law practice because of public concern over the interest being litigated, e.g.,
divorce practice, advocacy before governmental bodies, and criminal practice. MACKNNON,
supra note 172, at 45-52; SPEISER, supra, at §§ 2:4-2:7.
176. MACKINNON, supra note 172, at 44; SPEISER, supra note 175, at §2:9; see, e.g.,
Gaffney v. Harmon, 405 Ill. 273, 277, 90 N.E.2d 785, 788 (1950); Hightower v. Detroit Edison
Co., 262 Mich. 1, 9, 247 N.W. 97, 99 (1933).
177. MACKINNON, supra note 172, at 44-45, 60 n.62; SPEISER, supra note 175, at § 2:9;
see, e.g., Brillhart v. Hudson, 169 Colo. 329, 334, 455 P.2d 878, 881 (1969).
178. SPEISER, supra note 175, at § 2:10.
179. See Note, Contingent Fee Contracts: Validity, Controls, and Enforceability, 47
IOWA

L.

REV.

942, 949-50 (1962).

180. See, e.g., Taylor v. Bemiss, 110 U.S. 42 (1884); Hughes v. Eisner, 14 N.J. Super.
58, 81 A.2d 394 (Super. Ct. 1951).
181. See, e.g., MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 93-8601 (1947) (court administration of fees
in probate); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-646 (1974) (claims filed under unemployment compensation
acts); N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 474 (McKinney 1968) (prosecuting claims for infants).
182. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, §2126 (1975); IND. STAT. ANN. § 22-3-4-12 (1974);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.

ch. 152, § 13 (1958).

183. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, §2127 (1975) (thirty percent or $2250, whichever
is smaller); Ky. REV. STAT. § 342.320 (1972) (twenty percent of amount recovered); Miss. COnE
ANN. § 71-3-63 (1972) (twenty-five percent of total recovery).
184. E.g., 22 U.S.C. § 1623(f) (1970) (claims before Foreign Commission; fee limited to
ten percent); 25 U.S.C. § 70n (1970) (Indian claims; fee limited to ten percent).
185. 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1970).
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ings or the judgment.'86 The constitutionality of statutes restricting
87
fees has not been challenged.'
Courts have always supervised unreasonable contingent fees in
individual cases; more recently judicial power to regulate the practice of law has been applied to promulgate rules of general application that regulate contingent fees. An early case, Shannon v.
Cross,' 8 held such a rule unconstitutional. In that 1928 decision, a
Michigan circuit court rule required an attorney to stipulate the
absence of a contingent fee agreement if his client could not furnish
security for costs. Since those persons who were unable to provide
security were also most likely to require contingent fee arrangements, the rule effectively prevented the making of these contracts.
Holding that only a legislative enactment could limit the parties'
freedom to contract, the Michigan Supreme Court held that the rule
exceeded the judicial power to regulate practice and procedure.'8 9
The Supreme Court of Utah took a similar stance in Thatcher v.
IndustrialCommission.9 Though upholding the constitutionality of
a statutory regulation of fees in workmen's compensation cases, the
court declared in dicta:
We are not aware of any power in the judiciary to fix or regulate attorney's
fees. We do not think it can be inferred from the power to promulgate rules of
practice and procedure nor . . . from the auxiliary power to discipline attorneys as officers of the court for unprofessional conduct."'

The court supported its statement by arguing that despite their
power to determine whether a fee is reasonable after the fact, the
courts may not fix fees before agreement without violating the substantive freedom of contract.192
Two more recent cases have upheld judicial authority to establish guidelines for reasonable fees. In the New York decision of Gair
v. Peck, 93 the graduated scale of fees in question 9 ' permitted an
attorney and his client either to contract according to the limits of
the scale or to agree upon a fee no larger than thirty-three and one186. 28 U.S.C. § 2678 (1970).
187. See, e.g., Yeiser v. Dysart, 267 U.S. 540, 541 (1925); Frisbie v. United States, 157
U.S. 160, 165 (1895).
188. 245 Mich. 220, 222 N.W. 168 (1928).
189. Id. at 222, 222 N.W. at 168.
190. 115 Utah 568, 207 P.2d 178 (1949).
191. Id. at 574-75, 207 P.2d at 181.
192. Id. at 575, 207 P.2d at 181.
193. 6 N.Y.2d 97, 160 N.E.2d 43, 188 N.Y.S.2d 491 (1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 374
(1960).
194. N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't R.4. The rule applies to personal injury and wrongful
death litigation.
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third percent.'95 If a larger fee was stipulated, it was subject to
subsequent court approval.' 6 The New York Court of Appeals held
the rule to be a valid exercise of the judiciary's power over attorneys
as officers of the court. Finding that the rule was directed at fees
the courts would not enforce in any event, the court held that the
rule did not violate the freedom of attorneys and their clients to
enter contracts.'97 Rather, the court reasoned, the rule served as a
device to assist the court in determining whether an excessive
charge had occurred. The court argued that the rule did no more
than set a burden of proof useful in disciplinary actions by creating
a presumption of validity for fees within the schedule and a rebuttable presumption of invalidity for fees exceeding the schedule.',"
In Schlesinger v. Teitelbaum'99 the Third Circuit sustained a
local federal district court rule establishing a scale of contingent fees
for use in personal injury actions brought by seamen."' The rule
provided that the court would deem reasonable fees permitted by
the schedule, but would hold unreasonable any fee exceeding the
schedule unless unusual circumstances justified the higher amount.
The District Judge had followed the schedule, stating that it was
within his discretion to do so. 0' Holding that the schedule acted as
a procedural aid in establishing guidelines for reasonable fees, the
195.

Rule 4(b) provides that the following is the schedule of reasonable fees:
(1)
(A) Fifty per cent. on the first one thousand dollars of the sum recovered,
(B) Forty per cent. on the next two thousand dollars of the sum recovered,
(C) Thirty-five per cent. on the next twenty-two thousand dollars of the sum recovered,
(D) Twenty-five per cent. on any amount over twenty-five thousand dollars of the sum
recovered; or
(2)
A percentage not exceeding thirty-three and a third per cent. of the sum recovered, if
the initial contractual arrangement between the client and the attorneys so provides, in
which event the procedure hereinafter provided for making application for additional
compensation because of extraordinary circumstances shall not apply.
196. Rule 4(d) provides that:
In the event that claimant's or plaintiff's attorneys believe in good faith that the
foregoing schedule (1), because of extraordinary circumstances, will not give them adequate compensation, application for greater compensation may be made upon affidavit
. . . to the justice of the trial part to which the action had been sent for trial . ...
197. N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 474 (McKinney 1968) provides that compensation of attorneys is governed by the express or implied agreement of the parties.
198. 6 N.Y.2d at 114, 160 N.E.2d at 53, 188 N.Y.S.2d at 504.
199. 475 F.2d 137 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1111 (1973).
200. The schedule provided for a fee of thirty-three and one third percent of the first
$10,000 of recovery and twenty-five percent of the next $90,000.
201. 475 F.2d at 139. On appeal the Third Circuit limited its holding solely to the
instant facts. Id.
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Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the rule's use under the
court's supervisory power over the members of the bar." 2 Thus, two
cases have shown a willingness to permit limited fee regulation by
court rule; however, these decisions do not define the extent of this
judicial authority.
B.

American Trial Lawyers Association v. New Jersey Supreme
Court

In 1971, the New Jersey Supreme Court adopted N.J. Sup. Ct.
R. 1:21-7 which regulates contingent fee contracts in tort litigation.
Rule 1:21-7(c) set up a graduated scale of fee limits, providing:
In any matter where a client's claim for damages is based upon the alleged
tortious conduct of another,. . ., an attorney shall not contract for, or collect
a contingent fee in excess of the following limits:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)

50% on the first $1000 recovered;
40% on the next $2000 recovered;
33 1/3 % on the next $47,000 recovered;
20% on the next $50,000 recovered;
10% on any amount recovered over $100,000; and
where the amount recovered is for the benefit of an infant or incompetent and the matter is settled without trial the foregoing
limits shall apply, except that the fee on any amount recovered up
to $50,000 shall not exceed 25%.

Paragraph (e) declares, "Paragraph (c). . . is intended to fix maximum permissible fees. . . ," but paragraph (f) permits a lawyer at
the conclusion of a case to petition the appropriate judge for permission to collect a higher fee.20 3 Subsequent to the adoption of Rule
1:21-7(c), members of the New Jersey Bar brought a class action
challenging its constitutionality on the ground that it exceeds the
scope of the New Jersey Supreme Court's authority over the admission and discipline of attorneys. 2 4 The Superior Court, Appellate
202. Id. at 141.
203. Rule 1:21-7(f) provides:
If at the conclusion of a matter an attorney considers the fee permitted by paragraph
(c) to be inadequate, an application on written notice to the client may be made to the
Assignment Judge for the hearing and determining of a reasonable fee in light of all the
circumstances .

. .

. This rule shall not preclude the exercise of a client's existing right

to a court review of the reasonableness of an attorney's fee.
204. Plaintiffs originally brought suit in the United States District Court for New Jersey, alleging that Rule 1:21-7(c) violates both the United States and New Jersey
Constitutions. A three-judge court dismissed the claim on grounds of abstention, concluding
that the nature of the controversy between the state's highest court and those authorized by
that court to practice law required that it be litigated in state courts. American Trial Lawyers
Ass'n v. New Jersey Supreme Court, Civil Nos. 64-72 and 142-72 (D.N.J. June 20, 1972). On
appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed the judgment of dismissal and ordered the
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Division, upheld the rule as a valid exercise of the judiciary's power
to regulate the conduct of the legal profession," 5 and the New Jersey
28
Supreme Court affirmed. 1
The court first decided that it possessed the constitutional
power to adopt Rule 1:21-7(c). The court found that the New Jersey
Constitution made the state Supreme Court the exclusive repository
of the power to regulate the practice of law:207
The Supreme Court shall make rules governing the administration of all
courts in the State and, subject to the law, the practice and procedure in all
such courts. The Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction over the admission to
the practice of law and the discipline of persons admitted.'2s

The court recognized that because an express delegation of the rulemaking power is absent from the second sentence of the quoted
paragraph, this power arguably does not extend to the judiciary's
disciplinary authority. It reasoned, however, that since its constitutional authority can be extended to the fullest, it is not restricted
to acting in adjudicatory proceedings. Rather, the court argued, it
possesses the inherent power to act "legislatively" by promulgating
rules of general application. 29 To hold otherwise, said the court,
would be to invalidate all other rules regulating the professional
conduct of attorneys. 210 Then, relying on Gair and Schlesinger, the
court held that this power extended to the adoption of a reasonable
rule establishing the limits of permissible fees in tort litigation. 21'
On a second issue the court found that since it had acted legislatively, promulgation of the rule did not require an evidentiary
hearing. 2 No interference with the freedom of contract existed, the
District Court to retain jurisdiction pending the conclusion of state court proceedings. American Trial Lawyers Ass'n v. New Jersey Supreme Court, 409 U.S. 467 (1973).
While the District Court's dismissal was on appeal, plaintiffs filed an appeal in lieu of
prerogative writs with the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division. Finding the
appeal non-reviewable, the Appellate Division transferred the case to the Superior Court,
Law Division, Middlesex County. The trial court then invalidated Rule 1:21-7(c) on state
constitutional grounds. The case then reached the Appellate Division on appeal.
205. 126 N.J. Super. 577 (1974).
206. 66 N.J. 258, 261, 330 A.2d 350, 352 (1974). Since the Appellate Division's more
extensive analysis was adopted in toto by the Supreme Court, for purposes of this discussion
the opinions will be treated together.
207. State v. Rush, 46 N.J. 399, 217 A.2d 441 (1966).
208. N.J. CONST. art. VI, § H.
209. 126 N.J. Super. at 577.
210. E.g., regulating bar examinations and the licensing of attorneys (R. 1:23 to 27);
specifying who may practice law and appear in court (R. 1:21-1 to 4); adopting a canon of
professional ethics (R. 1:14).
211. 66 N.J. at 264-65, 330 A.2d at 353-54; 126 N.J. Super. at 586-88.
212. 66 N.J. at 265-66, 330 A.2d at 354; 126 N.J. Super. at 588-89.
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court reasoned, because attorneys have never had the right to enforce unreasonable fees. 2 3 Finally, the court found that Rule 1:217(c) does not violate equal protection, because a rational basis exists
for singling out contingent fee agreements for special treatment.
The court argued that they involve unique problems in the attorneyclient relationship since they give lawyers an interest in the litigation and establish by contract a method for compensation which
bears no relationship either to the effort expended by the attorney
or the actual value of his services. The court further held that the
rule may validly apply only to tort claims, finding that this is the
21
area in which contingent fee arrangements are most prevalent.
C.

Comment

Although Rule 1:21-7(c) appears similar to the court rules sustained in Gair and Schlesinger, closer examination reveals that it
is actually quite different. In upholding the constitutionality of Rule
4 under the judiciary's power to discipline attorneys, the New York
court regarded it not as a substantive regulation of fees, but as a
procedural tool declaring the burden of proof applied in disciplinary
hearings. This rule, said the Gair court, sets only a schedule of
reasonable fees, denominating those within it presumptively ethical.2" ' Conversely, Rule 1:21-7 explicitly states that paragraph (c)
sets a scale of maximum fees that holds those above it presumptively unethical. 2 1 Furthermore, while Rule 4 states that in the alternative the parties may contract for the traditional rate of thirtythree and one-third per cent, 2 7 Rule 1:21-7 provides for no such
possibility. A third difference between the New York and New Jersey rules appears in their procedures for obtaining greater compensation. Rule 4 provides that the parties may contract for a higher
fee before or after the institution of a suit, requiring only that a court
subsequently approve the fee. 21 8 Rule 1:21-7(c), however, flatly forbids the making of a contract not in conformity with the schedule,
and paragraph (f) only allows the parties to petition for greater
compensation after the conclusion of litigation.21 9 Similarly, while
the New Jersey rule attempts to set maximum limits, the rule at
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

126 N.J. Super. at 591-92.
Id. at 592-93.
See text accompanying notes 197 & 198 supra.
See text accompanying note 203 supra.
See note 195 supra.
See note 196 supra and accompanying text.
See note 203 supra and accompanying text.
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issue in Schlesinger purported to do no more than announce guidethat
lines in determining fees. In fact, the Third Circuit recognized
221
discretion.
his
at
rule
the
followed
had
the District Judge
This comparison indicates that Rule 1:21-7(c) has a different
constitutional basis than the rules upheld in Gair and Schlesinger.
The courts in the latter cases exercised the disciplinary power in
conjunction with the judiciary's power to regulate practice and procedure in the courts; their rules are adjudicatory in nature and do
not infringe upon the freedom of lawyers to contract apart from the
stated schedule. Therefore, these rules arguably do not conflict with
the statements in Shannon and Thatcher that only the legislatures
may regulate the rights of attorney and client to contract. Rule 1:217(c), however, cannot be sustained under the New Jersey Supreme
Court's authority over practice and procedure, for it is not primarily
designed to assist the courts in disciplinary hearings. Rather, in
restricting the fee that an attorney may originally charge, the rule
constitutes a fee-fixing enactment resembling the statutes which
limit contingent fees. Thus, in approving the courts' power to modify the substantive law of attorneys' fees, American Trial Lawyers
confers an authority exceeding the judicial power upheld in Gair
and Schlesinger. Future courts considering the adoption of rules
restricting contingent fees may well choose the course set by
22
American Trial Lawyers. '
The court had a laudable goal in exercising and upholding this
expansive authority. By setting limits on permissible contingent
fees, Rule 1:21-7(c) will protect potential clients from the exaction
of excessive fees. Its graduated scale is especially appropriate for
preventing fees far out of proportion to a lawyer's services. Where
the judgment or settlement obtained by a client is relatively small
but the lawyer still performs substantial services in initiating the
litigation, the lawyer's rate may be higher; where the client's recovery is greater but the lawyer's services do not proportionately increase, the permissible rate decreases. Even apart from controlling
possible abuses and overreaching, the rule will generally aid the
220. See text accompanying notes 201 & 202 supra.
221. One such decision appears imminent. The Board of Governors of the Florida Bar
has petitioned the Florida Supreme Court to amend its Disciplinary Rules to limit attorneys'
contingent fees. The proposal would limit fees to 33 1/3% of the recovery, if a case is settled
before a lawsuit begins; 40% of the recovery at the time of trial or if the case is settled after a
lawsuit begins; and 451i of the recovery if the trial is appealed or postjudgment proceedings
are required. There is also a limitation on that part of any recovery exceeding $500,000 which
may be collected at any stage of proceedings. Florida Bar News, October, 1975, at 1, col. 4.
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pecuniary interests of clients. Quite simply, the less the fee his
lawyer receives, the greater the amount of judgment or settlement
a client may retain.
In the aggregate, however, this rate ceiling may harm an even
greater number of potential clients. The contingent fee system is a
significant feature of the legal services market, because it allows
clients to "borrow" a lawyer's services until judgment or settlement. 2 1 Contingent fees are thus important since they enable impecunious litigants to gain access to the judicial system.21 3 If the rate
set by a statute or court rule is so low that it will not produce a profit
above an attorney's regular hourly rate, it will deter the average
lawyer from performing the services affected by the regulation, especially given the risk that the lawyer will not be compensated at all
if he does not prevail. Similar business decisions by many lawyers
to choose non-affected work might prevent numerous consumers
from obtaining competent representation for their cases. 24 Rule
1:21-7(c) is particularly capable of producing this adverse effect.
One pair of commentators suggests that the key variables in the
degree to which a selective rate ceiling affects the supply of legal
services are (1) how low the maximum is set, and (2) the breadth of
the regulation's application.25 Comparison of Rule 1:21-7(c) with
the rules sustained in Gair and Schlesinger indicates that it sets its
maximum rates generally lower, and that it is the only rule setting
its rate below twenty-five per cent for any portion of recovery. 2 6
Furthermore, the New Jersey rule applies to a much wider range of
litigation in governing all tort claims. 227 Therefore, while protecting
th interests of single clients in specific cases, Rule 1:21-7(c) may
inhibit consumers' access to legal services to an even greater extent.
222. See Schwartz & Mitchell, An Economic Analysis of the Contingent Fee in
Personal-InjuryLitigation, 22 STAN. L. REv. 1125 (1970).
223. See SPEISER, note 175 supra, at § 213; Brief for Appellants at 31.32, American Trial
Lawyers Ass'n v. New Jersey Supreme Court, 66 N.J. 258, 330 A.2d 350 (1974).
224. A Senate Judiciary Committee Report suggests that quality of representation is
directly proportionate to the amount of fee charged. In increasing the fees allowed by the
Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2678 (1970), Congress relied upon the Committee's
statement that higher fees were needed to assure "competent representation." S. REP. No.
1327, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADM. NEWS 2515, 2520 (1966).
225. Schwartz & Mitchell, supra note 222, at 1144-45.
226. See notes 195 & 200 supra and accompanying text.
227. See notes 194 & 200 supra and accompanying text.
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ATORNEYS' FEES AND PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION-LIMITING
ACCESS TO THE COURTS

In recent years there has been a substantial increase in public
interest litigation2 2 to enforce federal statutory and constitutional

rights. The difficulty in financing such litigation, however, threatens to limit its continued growth.29 Public interest law suits are
lengthy and complex and seek nonmonetary relief. 30 Thus many
important issues affecting large numbers of people are not litigated
because the prospective plaintiffs cannot afford to pay attorneys'

fees.2' Recognizing that the American rule, which denies fees to
successful litigants, 23 2 acts as an economic bar to such suits 233 federal
courts developed a "private attorney general" exception and
granted counsel fees to litigants vindicating important public policies.2 34 However, this development, which promised to overcome the
serious financial obstacles to public interest litigation2 5 and to en-

sure equal access to the courts for plaintiffs of moderate or limited
means,2 31 was abruptly halted by the Supreme Court's recent holding in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society.237 That
228. While public interest litigation is difficult to define, one commentator has noted
three characteristics which differentiate it from most lawsuits. First, the issues involved are
currently regarded as being of extreme importance. Their significance may be inferred from
recent congressional legislation, their fundamental nature or specific protection by the Constitution. Secondly, the final judgment will affect not only the plaintiffs, but a substantial
number of other individuals as well. Finally, public interest litigation is brought by a private
plaintiff rather than by a government agency. Nussbaum, Attorney's Fees in PublicInterest
Litigation,48 N.Y.U. L. REV. 301, 304-05 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Nussbaum].
229. See LaRaza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94, 101 (N.D. Cal. 1972), aff'd, 488 F.2d
559 (9th Cir. 1973); cert. denied, 417 U.S. 968 (1974); Hearings on Attorney's Fees Before the
Subcomm. on Representationof Citizen Interests Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. 800-01 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
230. Most public interest lawsuits do not seek damages out of which fees could be paid.
See, e.g., Sims v. Amos, 340 F. Supp. 691 (M.D. Ala.), aff'd mem., 409 U.S. 942 (1972)
(legislative reapportionment).
231. See Nussbaum, supra note 228, at 331; Hearings, supra note 229, at 801.
232. See C. McCoRMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES §§ 60-71 (1935); SPEISER,
supra note 175, at § 12:3.
233. See Note, PrivateAttorney GeneralFees Emerge from the Wilderness, 43 FORDHAM
L. REV. 258, 271 (1974); Comment, The DiscretionaryAward of Attorney's Fees by the Federal
Courts: Selective Deviation From the No-Fee Rule and the Regrettably Brief Life of the
Private Attorney General Doctrine, 36 OHIo ST. L.J. 588, 613 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
DiscretionaryAward].
234. See Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968) (per curiam);
Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients in Public Interest Litigation,88 HAlv. L. REv. 849,
888-89 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Dawson].
235. See Nussbaum, supra note 228, at 311.
236. See Comment, Court Awarded Attorney's Fees and Equal Access to the Courts,
122 U. PA. L. REv. 636, 655-56 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Equal Access].
237. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
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case held that in the absence of statutory authorization federal
courts lack the power to award attorney fees under the private attorney general 'rationale.
A.

Legal Background

Although English courts have taxed unsuccessful litigants with

costs for centuries, 23 American courts developed the rule that attor-

neys' fees in federal civil cases ordinarily are not recoverable in the
absence of specific statutory authority. 39 In disallowing the award
of attorneys' fees the United States Supreme Court recognized as
early as 1796 that "the general practice of the United States is in
oposition [sic] to [fee shifting] and even if that practice were not
strictly correct in principle, it is entitled to the respect of the court,
till it is changed, or modified by statute.2

4-

The practice in federal

courts was to follow the state rules governing awards of counsel fees
until 1853241 when, as a response to the lack of uniformity and
awards of large fees, Congress enacted legislation expressly limiting
the amount of counsel fees collectible from the losing party in federal civil courts to a nominal docket fee.2 12 Whether this docketing
238. At very early common law costs were not allowed. By 1278, however, the courts of
England were authorized to award counsel fees to successful plaintiffs in litigation. Statute
of Gloucester, 6 Edw. 1, c. 1 (1278). Since 1607 English courts have been empowered to award
counsel fees to defendants in all actions where such awards might be made to plaintiffs.
Statute of Westminster, 4 Jac. 1, c. 3 (1607). The award of costs was left entirely to the
discretion of the courts by the Supreme Court of Judicature Acts of 1873 and 1875. See
Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717 (1967); 2 F. POLLOCK
& F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 595 (1895);
Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849, 854-60 (1929) [hereinafter cited as Goodhart].
239. See note 232 supra. All other major nations award attorney fees to the prevailing
party. See Nussbaum, supra note 228, at 311 n.31; EqualAccess, supra note 236, at 639. For
theories on why the unique American rule developed see Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of
Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 792, 798-99 (1966); Discretionary
Award, supra note 233, at 593-95; Note, Attorney's Fees: Where Shall the Ultimate Burden
Lie?, 20 VAND. L. REV. 1216, 1218-21 (1967).
240. Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796). The Supreme Court has consistently adhered to the American rule. See F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Industrial
Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116 (1974); Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386
U.S. 714 (1967); Stewart v. Sonneborn, 98 U.S. 187 (1878); Flanders v. Tweed, 82 U.S. (15
Wall.) 450 (1872); Oelrichs v. Spain, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 211 (1872); Day v. Woodworth, 54
U.S. (13 How.) 362 (1851).
241. During the first years of the federal court system, Congress provided through
legislation that the federal courts were to follow the practice of the states in which they were
located in awarding attorney fees. Federal Judiciary Act of September 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 35,
1 Stat. 73. Although this legislation had expired by 1800, federal courts continued to defer to

state rules until 1853. See LAW,

THE JURISDICTION AND POWERS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS

279 (1852); 2 J. STREET, FEDERAL EQUITY PRACTICE § 1986 at 1188-89 (1909).
242. Act of 1853, ch. 80, 10 Stat. 161. Subsequent revisions resulted in the present
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fees statute precluded the award of all fees not enumerated caused
considerable judicial controversy. In The Baltimore the Supreme
Court reversed a $500 counsel allowance, holding that the docketing
fees statute prohibited the assessment of all attorney fees against
the opposite party "except the costs and fees therein described and
enumerated." '43 The Court held in Trustees v. Greenough, however,
that the statute does not prevent federal equity courts from
244
awarding attorneys' fees when considerations of justice so dictate.
Subsequent revision of the docketing fees statute has not significantly altered it,245 nor has the judicial controversy over its effect
subsided. Compounding the statutory interpretation problem, Congress has enacted legislation precluding the taxing of counsel fees
against the United States.246
While both Congress and the federal courts have long recog247
nized the rule against fee shifting as the prevailing American rule,
a number of exceptions have developed in response to widespread
criticism of it. 211 Several congressional enactments contain provicodified version which is not significantly different from the 1853 version:
Attorney's and proctor's docket fees in courts of the United States may be taxed as costs
as follows:
$20 on trial or final hearing (including a default judgment whether entered by the
court or by the clerk) in civil, criminal, or admiralty cases, except that in cases of
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction where the libellant recovers less than $50 the proctor's docket fee shall be $10;
$20 in admiralty appeals involving not over $1,000;
$50 in admiralty appeals involving not over $5,000;
$100 in admiralty appeals involving more than $5,000;
$5 on discontinuance of a civil action;
,$5 on motion for judgment and other proceedings or recognizances;
$2.50 for each deposition admitted in evidence.
28 U.S.C. § 1923(a) (1970).
243. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 377, 392 (1869); see Flanders v. Tweed, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 450,
452-53 (1872). See also In re Paschal, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 483, 493-94 (1870).
244. 105 U.S. 527, 535-36 (1881); see Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 530 (1962);
Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 164 (1939).
245. See note 242 supra.
246. 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1970).
247. The rationale used by the federal courts in upholding the American rule is fourfold.
(1) It is unfair to penalize a party that has elected to prosecute or defend a suit in good faith.
Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967). (2) The granting
of counsel fees would deter those plaintiffs fearful of incurring additional costs should they
be unsuccessful. Id. (3) The additional court time and expense involved in determining such
fees would pose substantial burdens for judicial administration. Id. (4) Courts are concerned
that court ordered fees might threaten the principle of independent advocacy; lawyers might
improperly defend their clients while attempting to appease the judge. F.D. Rich Co. v.
United States ex. rel. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116 (1974); see Note, supra note 233,
at 259.
248. See Ehrenzweig, supra note 239; Goodhart, supra note 238; Kuenzel, The Attorney's Fee: Why Not a Cost of Litigation, 49 IOWA L. REV. 75 (1963); Mause, Winner Takes
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sions mandating a reasonable award of counsel fees to the prevailing
litigant. 24 9 Other federal statutes authorize the federal courts to use
their own discretion in allowing attorneys' fees to the successful
party.2 0 Judicially created exceptions to the prevailing American
rule based on "the historic jurisdiction of the federal courts ' 2 ' are
sanctioned "when overriding considerations of justice seem to compel such a result. ' 2 2 This inherent equitable power of the federal
courts is responsible for three major nonstatutory exceptions to the
American rule. First, federal equity courts have awarded attorneys'
fees to litigants whose opponents have pursued the litigation "in
bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly or for oppressive reasons." 3 While
the rationale for the bad faith exception was originally primarily
punitive,24 courts have recently expanded this exception in civil
rights cases by finding "bad faith" when a clearly defined right

exists and judicial assistance is needed in securing

it.25

A second

All: A Re-Examination of the Indemnity System, 55 IOWA L. REV. 26 (1969); McCormick,
Counsel Fees and Other Expenses of Litigationas an Element of Damages, 15 MINN. L. REv.
619 (1931); McLaughlin, The Recovery of Attorney's Fees:A New Method of FinancingLegal
Services, 40 FORDHAM L. REV. 761 (1972); Stirling, Attorney's Fees: Who Should Bear the
Burden?, 41 CAL. ST. B.J. 874 (1966); Stoebuck, Counsel Fees Included in Costs: A Logical
Development, 38 U. COLO. L. REV. 202 (1966); Note, Attorney's Fees, 43 Miss. L.J. 238 (1972);
DiscretionaryAward, supra note 233; Note, Attorney's Fees as an Element of Damages, 15
U. CINN. L. REV. 313 (1941); Equal Access, supra note 236; Note, supra note 239; Note,
Distributionof Legal Expense Among Litigants, 49 YALE L.J. 699 (1940).
249. See, e.g., Packers and Stockyards Act, 7 U.S.C. 210(f) (1970); Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act, 7 U.S.C. § 499(g)(b) (1970); Agricultural Fair Practices Act of 1967,
7 U.S.C. § 2305(a) (1970); Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970); Truth in Lending Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2) (1970); Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1970); Railway
Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 153(p) (1970); Merchant Marine Act of 1936, 46 U.S.C. § 1227 (1970);
Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 206 (1970); Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. §
16(2) (1970).
250. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77(k)(e) (1970); Trust Indenture Act,
15 U.S.C. § 77(www)(a) (1970); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78()(e), 78r(a)
(1970); Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 116 (1970); Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 501(b) (1970); Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1970); Clean Air Amendments
of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 1857n-2(d); Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(a)-(3)(b), (e)-(5)(k)
(1970); Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1970); Noise Control Act of 1972, 42
U.S.C. § 4911(d).
251. Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 164 (1939); see Guardian Trust Co.
v. Kansas City S. Ry., 28 F.2d 233 (8th Cir. 1928), rev'd on othergrounds, 281 U.S. 1 (1930).
252. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967).
253. Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 530 (1962); see Dawson, supra note 234, at 890
& n.155.
254. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973).
255. See, e.g., Bell v. School Bd., 321 F.2d 494 (4th Cir. 1963); Cato v. Parham, 293 F.
Supp. 1375 (E.D. Ark.), aff'd, 403 F.2d 12 (8th Cir. 1968). See also Dawson, supra note 234,
at 894; Note, Awarding Attorneys' Fees to the "Private Attorney General" Judicial Green
Light to Private Litigation in the Public Interest, 24 HASTINGs L.J. 733, 737-39 (1973);
DiscretionaryAward, supra note 233, at 607-08; Equal Access, supra note 236, at 660-61.
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exception is the common fund doctrine, which applies whenever a
litigant has secured or protected a fund in which others have a
beneficial interest."' In such a situation federal courts have held
that the other beneficiaries must share counsel fees.2 51 Recently,
courts have expanded this exception by eliminating the necessity of
an actual fund,' 56 holding that a substantial common benefit to an
ascertainable class of persons is sufficient to warrant the award of
attorneys' fees.2 59 The third and most recent exception to the American rule was the private attorney general rationale. Under this exception litigants enforcing and vindicating significant public policies through private litigation are granted reasonable attorneys'
fees. This exception is based on the recognition by federal courts
that the expense of litigation is often an insurmountable obstacle to
the private enforcement of important public policies. 6 "
The seminal decision in the development of the private attorney general rationale was Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises,
Inc. ,21,
a successful class action brought under Title II of the Civil
Rights Act of 196462 to enjoin racial discrimination in restaurants.
Although Title II authorized courts to use discretion in awarding
attorneys' fees the Supreme Court rejected a restrictive interpretation of the provision limiting awards to cases involving bad faith.
Instead the Court found that Congress enacted the provision to
encourage the private enforcement of an important public policy.
The Court held that the plaintiff was entitled to an award of counsel
fees since in obtaining the injunction he was acting "not for himself
alone but also as a 'private attorney general,' vindicating a policy
Congress considered of the highest priority. 2 63 If successful plaintiffs were routinely forced to bear their own attorneys' fees, the
Court reasoned few parties could afford to advance the public interest.2"4 The Court expanded the Piggie Park rationale in Mills v.
256. Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 166 (1939); Trustees v. Greenough,
105 U.S. 527 (1881). See generally Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients: Attorney Fees
from Funds, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1597 (1974).
257. Id.
258. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970); Bosch v. Meeker Cooperative
Light & Power Ass'n, 257 Minn. 362, 101 N.W.2d 423 (1960).
259. Id. See generally Comment, Attorneys' Fees: What Constitutes a "Benefit" Sufficient to Award Fees From Third Party Beneficiaries, 1972 WASH. U.L.Q. 271.
260. Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (per curiam).
261. 390 U.S. 400 (1968).
262. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(a) (1970).
263. 390 U.S. at 402.
264. Id.
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Electric Auto-Lite Co.,2"' a case brought by minority shareholders
charging violation of federal proxy regulations."' 5 Although the federal statute was silent concerning attorneys' fees, the Court awarded
counsel fees on the basis of both the common benefit doctrine2 71 and
the private attorney general rationale. Finding private litigation
essential to the enforcement of fair corporate suffrage, the Court
reasoned that plaintiffs were entitled to an award of fees since "private stockholders' actions of this sort 'involve corporate therapeutics', and furnish a benefit to all shareholders by providing an important means of enforcement of the proxy statute. 2 51 In Hall v.
Cole211 a union member sued his union under the free speech provisions of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act.7 0
The Court held that it was within the equitable power of the federal
courts to grant attorneys' fees against the union since the plaintiff
had conferred a substantial benefit on all the members of the union
by vindicating their free speech interests.2 ' Considered together,
Piggie Park, Mills, and Hall stood for the proposition that federal
equity courts have the power in the absence of statutory authorization to award counsel fees to private litigants vindicating a signifi22
cant public policy.
In recent years the private attorney general rationale has
emerged as the major exception to the American rule. After Piggie
Park and Mills, lower federal courts awarded counsel fees in an
increasingly wider range of public interest cases, 7 but with no spe265. 396 U.S. 375 (1970). For a good discussion of the Mills opinion see Note, Allocation
of Attorney's Fees After Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 38 U. CHL L. REv. 316 (1971).
266. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 7(aa) (1970).
267. See note 259 supra and accompanying text.
268. 396 U.S. at 396. See Note, Awarding Attorney and Expert Witness Fees in Environmental Litigation,58 CORNELL L. REV. 1222, 1237 (1973); 38 U. CH. L. REV., supra note 265,
at 333; Equal Access, supra note 236, at 662-75. Seegenerally Hornstein, Legal Therapeutics:
The "Salvage" Factorin Counsel Fee Awards, 69 HARv. L. REV. 658 (1956).
269. 412 U.S. 1 (1973).
270. 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2) (1970).
271. 412 U.S. at 8.
272. Nussbaum, supra note 228, at 321.
273. See, e.g., Souza v. Travisono, 512 F.2d 1137 (1st Cir. 1975) (protection of prisoners'
constitutional right of meaningful access to the courts); Brandenburger v. Thompson, 494
F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1974) (welfare benefits discrimination action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1970)); Fairley v. Patterson, 493 F.2d 598 (5th Cir. 1974) (reapportionment suit under Voting
Rights Act of 1965); Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 444 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1971) (housing
discrimination action under 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970)); Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of
America, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 1219 (C.D. Cal. 1973) (private antitrust suit seeking injunctive
relief); Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 353 F. Supp. 124 (1972) (fourth amendment rights against
illegal search and seizure); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), af'd in
part sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974) (protection of mentally
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cific guidelines, they were unable to establish uniformity as to the
scope of the exception. 24 At least one federal circuit refused to adopt
the private attorney general exception altogether.2 5 Despite the confusion and conflict surrounding the application of the doctrine, commentators predicted that the exception would eventually result in
27
the demise of the restrictive American rule against fee shifting.
Given the conflict in the lower federal courts over its application, it
seemed inevitable that the Supreme Court would grant certiorari to
determine the legitimacy of the private attorney general rationale
in the absence of statutory authorization.
B.

Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society

Environmental concerns about the possible adverse effects of
the trans-Alaska oil pipeline provided the Court with the opportunity to determine the question. In March, 1970, three private environmental interest groups 277 brought suit to enjoin the Secretary of the
Interior from issuing permits required for construction of the pipeline. 27 1 The United States District Court for the District of Columbia
retarded patients' right to adequate care and treatment in state hospitals); NAACP v. Allen,
340 F. Supp. 703 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (employment discrimination action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1970)); La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94 (N.D. Cal. 1972), aff'd, 488 F.2d 559 (9th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 968 (1974) (environmental protection and relocation of persons
displaced by highway project); see Dawson, supra note 234, at 888-907; Nussbaum, supra note
228, at 321-30; Equal Access, supra note 236, at 655-70.
274. See, e.g., Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (en banc),
rev'd sub nom. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975) (balance
of equities in favor of an award to plaintiff); Brandenburger v. Thompson, 494 F.2d 885 (9th
Cir. 1974) (award of attorneys' fees should be made to a litigant who furthers the interests of
a significant class of persons by effectuating a strong congressional policy); Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 484 F.2d 1331 (1st Cir. 1973) (when private litigation vindicates
a significant public policy, and, at the same time, creates a widespread benefit, policy favors
awarding attorneys' fees against a party who exists to serve or represents the interests of all
those benefitted).
One leading decision suggested three criteria to be used in awarding fees under the
private attorney general theory: (1) enforcement of a strong congressional policy; (2) benefits
a large class of people; (3) necessity and financial burden of private enforcement make award
essential. La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94, 99-100 (N.D. Cal. 1972), aff'd, 488 F.2d 559
(9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 968 (1974).
275. Bradley v. School Bd., 472 F.2d 318, 327-31 (1972), vacated on othergrounds, 416
U.S. 696 (1974).
276. See McLaughlin, supra note 248; DiscretionaryAward, supra note 233.
277. Plaintiffs were the Wilderness Society, Environmental Defense Fund, Inc., and
Friends of the Earth.
278. In June, 1969, the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System, formed by Atlantic Richfield
Co., Humble Oil and Refining Co. and British Petroleum Corp., submitted an application
for a right-of-way for construction of an oil pipeline that would transport oil from the North
Slope of Alaska along federally owned land. An amended application was filed in December,
1969, requesting additional right-of-way and land use permits. After the Secretary of the
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granted a preliminary injunction. 21 Subsequently, defendant, a private pipeline company, 8 was permitted to intervene.28 ' After further consideration the district court dissolved the preliminary injunction, denied a permanent injunction and dismissed the complaint. 21 On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed, holding that construction of the pipeline would violate
federal law. 283 Following congressional enactment of legislation permitting construction of the pipeline, 284 plaintiffs filed a request for
an award of attorneys' fees, contending that counsel fees should be
assessed against the defendant in federal cases initiated by a
plaintiff acting as a private attorney general vindicating important
public interests. Defendant argued that, absent specific statutory
authority, federal courts are not free to fashion a private attorney
general exception to the prevailing American rule which holds that
each litigant must pay his own attorney fees. Rejecting defendant's
argument, the Court of Appeals ruled that since plaintiffs had
acted to vindicate "important statutory rights of all citizens ... "
they were entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees. 85 The SuInterior indicated that approval of the pipeline would be forthcoming, plaintiffs filed suit in
March, 1970. For a discussion of the events surrounding this litigation see Dominick & Brody,
The Alaska Pipeline:Wilderness Society v. Morton and the Trans-AlaskaPipelineAuthorization Act, 23 AM. U. L. REv. 337 (1973).
279. Wilderness Soc'y v. Hickel, 325 F. Supp. 422 (D.D.C. 1970). The District Court
granted the preliminary injunction in April, 1970, on the grounds that the right-of-way was
in violation of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, 30 U.S.C. § 185 (1970), and for noncompliance
with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1970).
280. Defendant is Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. Alyeska replaced the Trans-Alaska
Pipeline System in 1970. Alyeska is owned by ARCO Pipeline Co., Inc., Sohio Pipeline Co.,
Humble Pipeline Co., Mobil Pipeline Co., Phillips Petroleum Co., Amerada Hess Corp., and
Union Oil Co. of Calif.
281. The State of Alaska was also permitted to intervene as a defendant. The interventions occurred in September, 1971.
282. The decision is not reported. See Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842, 851
(D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 917 (1973). The dismissal occurred after the
Interior Department released an environmental impact statement study on the pipeline and
announced that the permits would be granted to Alyeska.
283. 479 F.2d 842 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc). The decision, in February, 1973, was based
solely on the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, 30 U.S.C. § 185 (1970).
284. Act of Nov. 16, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-153, 87 Stat. 576 (codified in scattered sections
of 15 & 44 U.S.C.). The legislation also imposed stringent liability standards on Alyeska and
required it to pay for administrative costs and land acquisition. See Alyeska Pipeline Co. v.
Wilderness Soc'y 421 U.S. 240, 285 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
285. Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (en banc). The court
of appeals ruled that Alyeska must pay one-half of plaintiffs' attorneys' fees. But the court
ruled that 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1970) prohibited taxing fees against the Department of the
Interior and held that it would be inappropriate to burden the State of Alaska with any part
on the award since it had intervened voluntarily to present a different version of the public
interest implications of the trans-Alaska pipeline.
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preme Court reversed in an opinion by Justice White. " 6 Instead of
merely finding the private attorney general exception inapplicable
on the facts,2 7 the Court held that in the absence of statutory authorization federal courts lack power to award attorneys' fees on a
private attorney general theory.
Relying primarily on the The Baltimore,28 the Court initially
determined that the docketing fees statute 289 was intended to limit
the award of counsel fees to specified sums. While recognizing that
the language of the original act that "no other compensation shall
be taxed and allowed" has been deleted, "9 ' the Court asserted that
the "general statutory rule" established in 1853 was carried forward
by successor provisions29' that limit awards of counsel fees to nominal statutory amounts.2 92 The Court acknowledged that the fee statutes allow the federal courts, in the exercise of their inherent equitable power, to award counsel fees in bad faith and common fund
situations. According to the Court, however, the award of fees in
these situations, unlike under the private attorney general theory,
293
does not conflict with the language and policy of the fee statutes.
Although the Court noted that Congress has specifically authorized
the award of attorneys' fees in various statutes and has elected to
rely on private enforcement through litigation, the Court could discern no congressional grant of authority to the federal courts to
discard the traditional rule against nonstatutory allowances to the
prevailing party and award counsel fees to private attorneys general
On the basis for determining the fee award, the court observed: "The fee should represent
the reasonable value of the services rendered, taking into account all the surrounding circumstances, including, but not limited to, the time and labor required on the case, the benefit to
the public, the skill demanded by the novelty or complexity of the issues, and the incentive
factor." 495 F.2d at 1036. The plaintiffs' bill of costs included 4,455 hours of attorneys' time
spent on the litigation.
286. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Blackmun, and Rehnquist joined in
Justice White's opinion. Justices Brennan and Marshall wrote dissenting opinions. Justices
Douglas and Powell did not participate in the decision.
287. The dissents in the Court of Appeals accepted the private attorney general rationale but argued that it did not apply in this case since the plaintiffs had not prevailed on the
merits and did not confer a discernible, undisputed public benefit. 495 F.2d at 1043 (Wilkey,
J., dissenting).

288. See note 243 supra and accompanying text.
289. See note 242 supra and accompanying text.
290. 421 U.S. at 256-57 n.29. The language was deleted when the fees provision was
revised and codified in the 1948 Code. See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 123, 62 Stat. 955-56
(enacting 28 U.S.C. §§ 1920, 1923).
291. The current provisions are 28 U.S.C. §§ 1920, 1923 (1970).
292. 421 U.S. at 255-57.
293. Id. at 257-60.
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vindicating important public policies.2 94 Furthermore, the Court
observed, adoption of the private attorney general theory would
force the courts either to "pick and choose" among various claims
or fashion a "drastic" exception under which fees would be awarded
in any successful action brought under a federal statute. 29 5 Finally,
noting that the federal government is statutorily immune from fee
awards,2 9 the Court questioned the fairness and rationality of
awards against private parties, since one of the main functions of a
private attorney general is to force federal officials to comply with
statutory provisions. 297 Given the statutory embodiment of the
American rule in the fee statutes and positing the inability of the
courts in the absence of legislative guidance to distinguish between
"important" and "unimportant" public policies, the Court concluded that the decision to institute a private attorney general exception to the prevailing American rule is a policy matter for Congress rather than the federal courts and that the award of counsel
fees to the instant plaintiffs must be reversed.
Writing in dissent, Justice Marshall 2 8 was unable to discern
any basis in prior Supreme Court decisions for holding that the
docketing fees statute represents a statutory embodiment of the
American rule and operates as a general bar to fee shifting.299 Drawing on a long line of Supreme Court precedent, he found that the
award of attorneys' fees is "not strictly a matter of statutory construction but has an independent basis in the equitable powers of
the courts. ' 30 While acknowledging that the majority's concern
294. Id. at 260-63.
295. Id. at 269. See id. at 264 n.39, 266. Although numerous commentators have criticized the American rule, the Court declared that the rule is "deeply rooted in our history and
in congressional policy; and it is not for us to invade the legislature's province ...
" Id. at
270-71 & n.45.
296. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1970).
297. See 421 U.S. at 265-68.
"298. Justice Brennan filed a very brief dissenting opinion agreeing with Justice Marshall that the federal courts have the power to award attorneys' fees on a private attorney
general rationale, and expressly adopting the reasoning of the court of appeals in the conclusion that this was an appropriate case for the exercise of that power. See 421 U.S. at 271-72
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
299. Marshall analyzed the decisions in Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1881),
Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939), and Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527
(1962), and found no indication in any of the opinions that 28 U.S.C. § 1923 embodied the
American rule or that it barred all other fee shifting. Marshall also pointed out that in
Fleischmann DistillingCorp. v. Maier Brewing Co., the Court treated § 1923 not as a statutory embodiment of the American rule, but "as a general exception to the American rule."
386 U.S. at 718 n.11.
300. 421 U.S. at 274 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall also argued that the
current fee statute should not be read as if the language of the 1853 Act indicating the
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with the lack of meaningful standards was legitimate, Marshall
suggested that the federal courts had already developed adequate
criteria for applying the exception."' According to Marshall attorneys' fees should be placed upon the defendant if:
. . (1) the important right being protected is one actually or necessarily
shared by the general public or some class thereof; (2) the plaintiff's pecuniary
interest in the outcome, if any, would not normally justify incurring the cost
of counsel; (3) shifting that cost to the defendant would effectively place it on
a class that benefits from the litigation. 32
*

Marshall concluded that the criteria were met in the instant case
and that attorneys' fees should be awarded to plaintiffs under the
private attorney general rationale." 3
C.

Comment

As Justice Marshall effectively demonstrated' 4 the Court's statutory analysis is unconvincing. The Court insisted that the docketing fees statute represents a general statutory embodiment of the
American rule limiting the award of counsel fees to amounts enumerated, but it failed to distinguish the Greenough line of cases
which has consistently interpreted the statute to allow additional
fee shifting."5 Furthermore, the Court adopted a narrow view of the
independent power of equitable courts, which as the dissent points
out, is unsupported by prior case law." 6 The majority opinion misread Mills, Hall and other cases which clearly asserted the
independent equitable power of the federal courts to award attorney
fees "when the interests of justice so require. '3 7 Although the Court
recognized that the federal judiciary retains the inherent equitable
power to award counsel fees in bad faith and common fund situations, it failed to articulate a principled basis for refusing to recognize that power under the private attorney general rationale. While
the common fund and private attorney general exceptions may be
distinguished in that the former does not necessarily involve assessment of fees against an opposing party, the bad faith and private
exclusivity of the statutory compensation were still included. Id. at 278-81 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
301. Id. at 284.
302. Id. at 285.
303. See id. at 285-88.
304. See id. at 274-82 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
305. See note 244 supra and cases cited therein.
306. See notes 251, 252, 299 supra and accompanying text.
307. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1973), quoting Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307
U.S. at 166; Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. at 391-92.
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attorney general exceptions cannot be distinguished on that ground.
The majority's argument that congressional authorization of fee
awards in some statutes shows a congressional intent to preclude
awards in others also is not convincing. In awarding attorneys' fees
under statutes silent about counsel fees in previous cases the Court
held that congressional silence did not imply an intent to preclude
equitable fee awards unless the statute in question specifies remedies in great detail. 08 The Court correctly pointed out that the private attorney general rationale is seriously weakened by the federal
statute precluding the award of fees against the federal government,3 9 but as the dissent argued the majority failed to explain why
this necessitates complete abandonment of the private attorney
general exception. 10
In addition to highlighting the weakness of the Court's statutory analysis, the dissenting opinion appears to answer adequately
the majority's concerns about the manageability and fairness of a
judicially created private attorney general exception. Rather than
focusing on the relative merits of the policies involved, Marshall's
suggested criteria emphasize the need to provide access to the courts
for normally unrepresented interests so that federal courts are informed fully of the consequences of available choices and have a
sound basis for making decisions." Under Marshall's test awards
would be granted to any party vindicating a federal statutory or
constitutional provision 31 2 where the fee ultimately could be shifted
by the losing defendant to the general public who are the beneficiaries of the litigation.1 3 This "public benefit" approach eliminates the
problem of judges' making awards based on their subjective determination of the importance of the policies vindicated, ensures that
defendants are not deterred from advancing their interests in court,
and obviates the fairness problem of imposing costs on losing defendants who differ greatly in their forms of misconduct, degrees of
308. See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. at 390-91, distinguishingFleischmann
Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714 (1967).
309. See note 296 supra and accompanying text.
310. 421 U.S. at 282 n.6 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
311. See Stewart, The Reformation of American AdministrativeLaw, 88 HARV. L. REv.
1667, 1756-60, 1768 n.468 (1975), Note, supra note 233, at 267. The opinion in the court of
appeals appears to be based in part on this interest-representation rationale. 495 U.S. at 103031.
312. 421 U.S. at 285 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
313. Id. at 285, 288. See Comment, Liability for Attorney's Fees in the Federal
Courts-The Private Attorney General Exception, 16 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 201, 212-13
(1975).
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fault, and ability to pay.31 1 While such an approach poses problems
of "nuisance" suits brought to enforce relatively unimportant statutory provisions, 3 5 these problems have not proved to be an insuperable barrier to the recent expansion of standing by the Court.31 1 Moreover, federal courts possess ample discretionary powers to deny fees
where the litigation is clearly frivolous or intended to harass the
defendant.3 1 7 Finally, by awarding fees to representatives of such
interests, the courts would be continuing their special concern for
the rights of those who are not adequately represented in the other
318
branches of government.
Even assuming that Marshall's test does not fully meet the
majority's concerns, the Court would have retained the private attorney general rationale by limiting its application to cases involving constitutional rights.3 1 Since constitutional rights are clearly of
the "highest priority" such an approach would eliminate concerns
about the propriety of judicial policy-making.3 0 Further, it would
limit the courts to deciding questions in which they have an independent and legitimate concern. Finally, it would appear desirable
to encourage vindication of constitutional rights, even at the ex32
pense of other social values. '
In the absence of future congressional legislation providing for
the award of attorneys' fees in a broad range of cases, the Court's
decision effectively curtails public interest litigation in the federal
courts.32 2 As the Court itself recognized in Piggie Park, without the
314. See Dawson, supra note 234, at 902-05.
315. See 24 HASTINGS L.J., supra note 255, at 756; Note, supra note 265, at 334.
316. See, e.g., United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures,
412 U.S. 669 (1973); Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d
994, 1005 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
317. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 484 F.2d 1331 (1st Cir. 1973);
Nussbaum, supra note 228, at 333 n.146; Note, supra note 233, at 270. Moreover, federal
courts also possess discretionary powers to keep frivolous or nuisance litigation out of court.
For example, a suit can be dismissed for lack of standing if the plaintiffs are not "representative" or "responsible" individuals or groups. See id.
318. Professor Bickel characterized this widely shared perception as the Supreme
Court's "function of guarding the elemental integrity of a system in which all groups have
access to political power. . . ." A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS
86 (1970).
319. See Falcon, Award of Attorneys'Fees in Civil Rights and ConstitutionalLitigation,

33

MD.

L.

REV.

380, 415-16 (1973).

320. Id. at 416.
321. It is generally considered that constitutional rights stand somewhat above the
ordinary balancing process among competing social policies. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618, 627-33 (1969). See generally Note, Specifying the ProceduresRequired by Due
Process: Toward Limits on the Use of Interest Balancing, 88 H~av. L. REv. 1510 (1975).
322. While the Court approved the common benefit and bad faith exceptions and thus
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private attorney general exception, the prohibitive cost of attorneys'
fees would in most instances effectively discourage public interest
litigation. 32 Public interest suits are complex, time-consuming, and
expensive. Furthermore, such litigation seeks only injunctive and
declaratory relief, not damages. Therefore, rarely will an individual-even a wealthy individual-be willing to institute litigation to
vindicate important public rights.3 24 Lack of funds, an overwhelming caseload, and government restrictions prevent Legal Services
from providing even a partial answer to the problem.2 2 Thus, in
most cases involving major litigation the foundation-funded public
32
interest firm provides the only realistic source of representation. 1
However, such support is inadequate to fund continuous major litigation, 327 is declining, and cannot be expected to continue indefi328
nitely .
Following the Court's decision any solution to the problem of
financing public interest litigation in the federal courts will necessarily come from Congress. Since Alyeska Congress has introduced
329
a number of bills on the general subject of attorneys' fee awards.
Most of the proposals adopt a statute-by-statute approach limiting
award of fees to certain areas of the law such as antitrust or civil
rights. 3 A more desirable approach, however, would be the enactment of a comprehensive statute awarding attorneys' fees to plainleft open the possibility of judicial fee shifting in the absence of statutory authorization, it
placed some restrictions on their application. Finding litigation which benefited the general
public "ill suit[ed]" to the common benefit rationale, the Court restricted the exception to
cases where the beneficiaries are "[few] in number and easily identifiable;" the benefits
"traced with some accuracy;" and the costs "shifted with some exactitude [as] to those
benefiting." 421 U.S. at 265 n.39. By limiting the bad faith exception to cases involving
"vexatious" or "oppressive" conduct by the losing party, the Court disapproved of federal
court cases finding "bad faith" merely on the basis of a clearly defined and established right
and a need for judicial assistance in rescuing that right. 421 U.S. at 258-59. Thus, it appears
that the Court would hold these exceptions applicable in relatively few cases.
.323. 390 U.S. at 402; see Note, Federal Funds for Public Interest Law: Plausibility,
Politics and Past History, 13 ARIZ. L. REv. 932 (1971); Hearings, supra note 229, at 861.
324. See NAACP v. Allen, 340 F. Supp. 703, 710 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd, 493 F.2d 614
(5th Cir. 1974); Hearings, supra note 229, at 789, 801.
325. See Nussbaum, supra note 228 at 306-07; Note, supra note 230, at 269; Hearings,
supra note 229, at 800-01, 847.
326. See Hearings, supranote 229, at 842.
327. Id.
328. See Hearings on Attorneys Fees Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties
and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,94th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1975) (testimony of Reuben B. Robertson) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on Attorneys
Fees]; Hearings,supra note 229, at 1244 (statement of Barry Chase).
329. See, e.g., S. 2278, 2871, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 8219, 8220, 8221, 8368,
8532, 8742, 8743, 9093 and 9552, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
330. See, e.g., H.R. 8219, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) authorizing fee awards to successful litigants in actions under the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1970); S. 2278, 94th Cong., 1st
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tiffs vindicating any federal statutory or constitutional provision. 3'
Such an approach would ensure effective private enforcement of
other important federal rights and equal access to the courts for
persons of moderate or limited means. 3 2 In addition, since most
public interest suits are brought to enforce statutory obligations of
the federal government, fees should be awarded against the government as well as private parties. 3 3 Finally, since the complexity of
public interest litigation requires the employment of numerous expert witnesses and the use of technical studies, 334 Congress should
enact legislation awarding all reasonable costs of litigation as well
as attorney fees. 3 5 Legislation providing for attorneys' fees and other
reasonable costs would overturn the Supreme Court's ill-considered
decision in Alyeska, overcome the serious financial obstacles to public interest litigation, and ensure equal access to the courts for persons seeking to enforce important federal policies.
VI.

ATTORNEYS' FEES AND THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT

Much public interest litigation is brought to enforce federal law
against state officials.3 36 Recognizing that the limited resources of
most plaintiffs 337 and the nonmonetary nature of the relief obtained 338 make financing such litigation difficult, federal courts
Sess. (1975) authorizing fee awards to successful litigants in actions under 42 U.S.C. §§ 198183, 1985-86 (1970), and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to d-6
(1970).
331. See S. 2871, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 8221, 8742, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1975); Hearings on Attorneys Fees, supra note 328 (testimony of Bruce J. Terris).
332. See Equal Access, supra note 236, at 678-79; Hearings on Attorneys Fees, supra
note 328.
333. See Hearings on Attorneys Fees, supra note 328 (testimony of John Ferren).
334. See S. 2871, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); Hearings on Attorneys Fees, supra note
328 (testimony of John Ferren).
335. Id. Senators Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.) and Charles Mathias (R-Md.) have
recently introduced S. 2715, which would amend Chapter 5 of Title 5, United States Code
(Administrative Procedure Act) to permit awards of reasonable attorneys' fees and other
expenses for public participation in proceedings before Federal agencies, and for other purposes. Hearings have been held on the proposal, and Congress is expected to act on it during
the present session.
336. See Note, A Practical View of the Eleventh Amendment-Lower Court Interpretations and the Supreme Court's Reaction, 61 GEo. L.J. 1473-74 & n.5 (1973).
337. Many public interest suits against state officials are brought by individuals employed by or receiving benefits from the state. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 519 F.2d 559
(2d Cir.), cert. granted, 423 U.S. 1031 (1975) (state employees); Souza v. Travisono, 512 F.2d
1137 (1st Cir. 1975) (prison inmates); Brandenburger v. Thompson, 494 F.2d 885 (9th Cir.
1974) (welfare recipients); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd in part
sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974) (mentally retarded patients). In
any case most individual plaintiffs cannot match the resources which state governments can
devote to litigation. See Note, Attorneys' Fees and the Eleventh Amendment, 88 HARv. L.
REv. 1875 n.1 (1975).
338. Most public interests suits against states seek declaratory and injunctive relief, not
monetary relief out of which fees could be paid. See, e.g., Sims v. Amos, 340 F. Supp. 691
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awarded attorneys' fees from state funds in a wide range of cases. '
The Supreme Court's recent holding in Edelman v. Jordan311 that
the eleventh amendment bars retroactive payments out of state
funds has, however, greatly slowed this trend. Interpreting Edelman
as barring all monetary awards 34 ' or as prohibiting retroactive payments resembling damages, 342 three federal circuits have disallowed
counsel fee awards. Viewing the decision as allowing orders requiring state expenditures incidental 34 3 or necessarily related3 44 to securing or implementing permissible injunctive relief, four federal circuits have upheld the power of the federal judiciary to award fees.
Recognizing this conflict the Supreme Court recently granted certiorari to determine the propriety of fee awards against state officers
3 45
in their official capacity.
A.

Legal Background

The eleventh amendment 346 was enacted in 1798111 to overrule
(M.D. Ala., afl'd mem. 409 U.S. 942 (1972) (reapportionment). Even if monetary relief is
sought, the eleventh amendment bars such relief in almost all cases. See Edelman v. Jordan,
415 U.S. 651 (1974) and text accompanying notes 378-90 infra.
339. See, e.g., Gates v. Collier, 489 F.2d 298 (1973), rehearingen banc granted,500 F.2d
1382 (1974), remanded,522 F.2d 81 (5th Cir. 1975), aff'd, 44 U.S.L.W. 2405 (N.D. Miss. Feb.
3, 1976) (prison reform); La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94 (N.D. Cal. 1972), aft'd, 488
F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1973) (environmental protection); Sims v. Amos, 340 F. Supp. 691 (M.D.
Ala.), aff'd mem. 409 U.S. 942 (1972) (reapportionment).
340. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
341. Skehan v. Board of Trustees, 501 F.2d 31, 42 & n.7 (3d Cir. 1974) (dictum), vacated
on othergrounds, 421 U.S. 983 (1975); San Antonio Conserv. Soc'y v. Texas Highway Dept.,
496 F.2d 1017, rehearingen banc granted,496 F.2d at 1026 (1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 926,
aff'd 519 F.2d 1372 (5th Cir. 1975).
342. Jordan v. Gilligan, 500 F.2d 701 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 991 (1975).
343. Hutchinson v. Lake Oswego School Dist. No. 7, 519 F.2d 961, 967 & n.8 (9th Cir.
1975) (dictum); Thonen v. Jenkins, 517 F.2d 3, 8 (4th Cir. 1975); Souza v. Travisono, 512
F.2d 1137, 1139 (1st Cir. 1975).
344. Class v. Norton, 505 F.2d 123, 127 (2d Cir. 1974).
345. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 519 F.2d 559 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 423 U.S. 1031
(1975). While Alyeska prevents attorneys' fee awards under the private attorney general
rationale in the absence of statutory authorization, such awards remain permissible under
numerous federal statutes allowing or requiring fee awards to be made. In addition, it is likely
that Congress will enact legislation giving federal courts greater authority to award counsel
fees. See notes 329-35 supra and accompanying text. Thus the question on whether fees
may be awarded from state funds remains important.
346. The amendment provides: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of
the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State."
347. The necessary ratifications were actually accomplished by February 7, 1795, when
North Carolina ratified, but several of the states were slow to notify the federal government
of their action. Thus the eleventh amendment was ratified by three-fourths of the states less

19761

ATTORNEYS' FEES

the Supreme Court's holding in Chisholm v. Georgia34 that a state
was subject to suit in federal court by a citizen of another state.",
The rapid adoption of the amendment by the states was prompted
both by apprehension that creditors might use federal courts to
collect large outstanding debts350 and to recover lands confiscated or
placed in the public domain by legislative fiat 351 and by fear that
allowing individuals to bring suits in federal court would improperly
limit the states' sovereignty and independence within the federal
system .352 Although the eleventh amendment does not expressly provide that a state cannot be sued by its own citizens in federal court,
the Court found in Hans v. Louisiana35 3 that in adopting Article 1I
of the Constitution the framers intended to preserve the states'
common law immunity.354 The Court held, therefore, that states are
immune from all suits by individuals in federal court. Realizing that
some form of legal redress was necessary to prevent obstruction of
federal law and the violation of constitutional rights of private persons, the Court held in a 1908 case, Ex parte Young, 55 that state
officials might be enjoined from enforcing an unconstitutional state
law. The Court reasoned that an officer acting under an unconstitutional state statute loses his status as a representative of the state
than two years after the Chisholm decision. See C. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 59 (1972) [hereinafter cited as JACOBS]; Mathis, The Eleventh Amendment: Adoption and Interpretation, 2 GA. L. REv. 207, 228 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
Mathis].
348. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
349. The case involved a liability incurred by the state during the Revolutionary War.
See Mathis, supra note 347, at 217-24.
350. C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 99 (rev. ed. 1937)
[hereinafter cited as WARREN]; see Mathis, supra note 347, at 228. But see JACOBS, supra
note 347, at 69-74.
351. WARREN, supra note 350, at 99; JACOBS, supranote 347, at 57-64. Pending in federal
courts at the time the amendment was passed were several important suits seeking compensation from states for the repudiation of earlier land grants and for the confiscation of Loyalist
property. See JACOBS, supra, discussing Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798)
(repudiated land grant); Vassall v. Massachusetts (unreported Supreme Court case) (confiscation of Loyalist property); Moultrie v. Georgia (unreported Supreme Court case) (repudiated land sale).
352. Spencer Roane argued that the amendment had been adopted "because the states
claimed to be sovereign and independent States. . . ... C. HAINES, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME
COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITIcS 1789-1835 at 441 (1944). See also JACOBS, supra
note 347, at 69, 71.
353. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
354. Id. at 12-14; see Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 660-61 n.9 (1974); Mathis, supra
note 347, at 232; Note, Edelman v. Jordan:A New Stage in Eleventh Amendment Evolution,
50 NOTRE DAME LAW. 496, 498 (1975); Note, Private Suits Against States in Federal Courts,
33 U. CHI. L. REV. 331, 334 (1966).
355. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
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and becomes liable as an individual for the consequences of his
conduct.:5 By creating the fiction that it was restraining the individual rather than the state357 the Court attempted to maintain the
necessary balance between the eleventh and fourteenth amendments.3 58 The scope of the eleventh amendment was further limited
in Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Minnesota."' In upholding its power
to tax costs against a state appearing before it to oppose a criminal
appeal, the Court reasoned that although costs cannot be taxed
against a sovereign without its consent the state necessarily loses
some of its sovereignty when it becomes a party to litigation before
the Supreme Court.3 0 If the Court has jurisdiction to hear the case,
it is within the "inherent authority of the Court in the orderly administration of justice" to award costs. 3 1' The Court was, however,
unwilling to extend Ex parte Young and Fairmont Creamery to
compel state officers to pay damages or make equitable restitution
362
with state funds. In Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury
the Court found that, in suits to recover funds from a state treasury,
the state was the "real party in interest," and held that the eleventh
33
amendment barred the actions.
The power of the federal courts to award attorneys' fees from
state funds was first considered by the Supreme Court in the 1972
case of Amos v. Sims. 3 64 In Sims, a three-judge district court
awarded attorney fees out of state funds to plaintiffs, who had won
a case seeking reapportionment of the state legislature. The district
court answered eleventh amendment objections in a footnote by
finding that the state cannot immunize its officials from paying the
expenses, including attorneys' fees, incurred in obtaining permissible injunctive relief. 65 On appeal, the Supreme Court summarily
affirmed 36 over the defendant's objection that the district court
356.
357.

Id. at 159-60.
See Davis, Suing the Government by Falsely Pretending to Sue an Officer, 29 U.
CHI. L. REV. 435, 437 (1962).
358. See C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 48 at 186 (2d ed. 1970).
The Young Court created the fiction of individual restraint in order to avoid deciding whether
the adoption of the fourteenth amendment altered or limited the effect of the eleventh. 209
U.S. at 150.
359. 275 U.S. 70 (1927).
260. Id. at 74.
261. Id.
262. 323 U.S. 459 (1945).
363. Id. at 464. See Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 327 U.S. 573 (1946);
Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47 (1944).
364. 409 U.S. 942, aff'g mem. 340 F. Supp. 691 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
365. 340 F. Supp. at 694 n.8.
366. 409 U.S. 942, aff'g mem. 340 F. Supp. 691 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
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lacked jurisdiction to enter a monetary award against the state.3 11
Following Amos v. Sims, federal courts awarded counsel fees
out of state funds in a wide range of cases.388 In La Raza Unida v.
Volpe, 311 a federal district court awarded attorneys' fees to plaintiffs
who had successfully brought suit to enjoin construction of a state
highway project in violation of federal regulations. 7 Relying on
Fairmont and Sims, the court reasoned that jurisdiction over the
main action enabled it to award attorneys' fees as a necessary expense of litigation. 371 The Fifth Circuit expanded the Sims rationale
in Gates v. Collier.12 In Gates, plaintiffs brought suit challenging
the mistreatment of prisoners at the state penitentiary.373 After
granting declaratory and injunctive relief the district court abandoned the Young fiction of individual liability and awarded attorneys' fees against state officers in their official capacities.3 74 On
appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed.375 Reasoning that fee awards,
unlike damages, are an "integral part" of permissible equitable relief and a necessary incentive device to encourage private enforcement of federal statutory and constitutional rights, they concluded
that the eleventh amendment does not bar the award of counsel fees
37
paid from the state treasury.
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Edelman v. Jordan37 7
has, however, created considerable doubt as to the power of federal
courts to award attorney fees from state funds. In Edelman, plain' 8 brought
tiffP
a class action suit under the Civil Rights Act of 1964111
367. See Brief for Appellant at 17, Amos v. Sims, 409 U.S. 942 (1972); the jurisdictional argument of the Sims defendants is quoted in Gates v. Collier, 489 F.2d 298 (5th Cir.
1973), petition for rehearinggranted, 500 F.2d 1382 (5th Cir. 1974), remanded, 522 F.2d 81
(5th Cir. 1975), aff'd, 44 U.S.L.W. 2405 (N.D. Miss. Feb. 2, 1976).
368. See note 339 supra.
369. 57 F.R.D. 94 (N.D. Cal. 1972), aff'd, 488 F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1973).
370. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1970); Department
of Transportation Act of 1966, 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1970).
371. 57 F.R.D. at 101 n.11.
372. 489 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1973), petitionfor rehearinggranted, 500 F.2d 1382 (5th Cir.
1974), remanded, 522 F.2d 81 (5th Cir. 1975), afj'd, 44 U.S.L.W. 2405 (N.D. Miss. Feb. 2,
1976).
373. 349 F. Supp. 881 (N.D. Miss. 1972).
374. 489 F.2d at 300.
375. Id. at 298.
376. Id. at 302-03.
377. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
378. John Jordan was an applicant under the program. After a four-month delay in the
processing of his application he brought suit.
379. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) under which the action was brought provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
or any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
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to compel state officials administering the federal-state program of
Aid to the Aged, Blind, and Disabled to follow federal time limits
in processing applications and granting benefits and to release bene38
fits wrongfully withheld.3 The district court granted the relief. '
The Court of Appeals rejected the defendants' argument that the
eleventh amendment barred the award of retroactive benefits and
affirmed. 31 The Supreme Court reversed in a five-four decision. 3
While approving the grant of prospective injunctive relief against
state officers, the Court held that the eleventh amendment bars an
award of retroactive welfare benefits because of its resemblance to
'
a "monetary award against the State itself."384
In refusing to extend the principle of Ex parte Young to equitable relief requiring payment of state funds, the Court acknowledged
that orders entered in recent cases had considerable impact on state
treasuries.3 5 According to the Court, however, such financial consequences were the result of "necessary . . .compliance in the future
with a substantive federal-question determination" and thus an
"ancillary effect" permissible under Ex parte Young. 38 The
financial consequences of retroactive relief, on the other hand, resulted from efforts by state officials to compensate for past violations. 3 7 Finding retroactive payments indistinguishable from an
award of damages, the Court concluded that such relief is barred by
3 88
the eleventh amendment.
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
380. Regulations promulgated by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
(HEW) provided that benefits were required to begin after a prescribed period following
submission of a qualifying application. 45 C.F.R. § 206.10(a)(3) (1973), promulgated under
Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-85 (1970), superseded Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 301, 86
Stat. 1478 (effective Jan. 1, 1974). The Illinois Department of Public Aid, however, authorized
payments only after applications had been approved, even if the approval occurred after the
expiration of the applicable HEW time limit. See 415 U.S. at 655 n.4 quoting Categorical
Assistance Manual of the Illinois Department of Public Aid § 8225.1.
381. Jordan v. Weaver, Civil No. 71-c70 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
382. 472 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1973).
383. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, White, and Powell joined in Justice
Rehnquist's opinion. Justices Douglas and Brennan wrote dissenting opinions. Justice Marshall dissented in an opinion in which Justice Blackmun joined.
384. 415 U.S. at 665.
385. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970).
386. 415 U.S. at 668.
387. Id. at 668-69.
388. Id. at 669. In a footnote the Court suggested an alternative basis for its distinction
between retrospective and prospective payments. The Court asserted that a retrospective
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Although Edelman did not mention Amos v. Sims or refer to
attorneys' fees, some federal courts have interpreted the decision as
barring fee awards from state funds.389 Other federal courts have
granted counsel fees but have been unable to agree on a theory
justifying such awards.3 0 Recognizing the confusion in the lower
federal courts as to whether and under what circumstances fees may
be awarded out of state funds, the Supreme Court recently agreed
to review the Second Circuit's decision in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer 91
B.

Plaintiffs392

Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer

brought a class action suit under Title VII of the

1964 Civil Rights Act393 seeking declaratory and injunctive relief,

retroactive benefits and attorneys' fees from defendant state officials394 enforcing allegedly sexually discriminatory provisions of the

state employees retirement act.395 The district court granted the
injunctive relief but, interpreting Edelman as barring all retroactive
money judgments from state funds, denied the plaintiffs' request for
retroactive retirement benefits and attorneys' fees.3 6 On appeal, the
Second Circuit affirmed the denial of the back pay claim but re3 97
versed the bar of attorneys' fees.

39 the
Relying on Ford Motor Co. v. Department of the Treasury
award from state funds would have a greater immediate financial impact than future payments and thus would constitute a greater interference with the state's financial stability.
Id. at 666 n.11.
389. See, e.g., Skehan v. Board of Trustees, 501 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1974), vacated on other
grounds, 421 U.S. 983 (1975); San Antonio Conserv. Soc'y v. Texas Highway Dep't, 496
F.2d 1017, rehearing en banc granted, 496 F.2d at 1026 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 926, aff'd, 519 F.2d 1372 (5th Cir. 1975).
390. Compare, e.g., Thonen v. Jenkins, 517 F.2d 3 (4th Cir. 1975) (once federal court
has jurisdiction it has power to award attorney fees as incident of hearing) with Class v.
Norton, 505 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1974) (fee awards permissible since necessary to ensure future
compliance with federal law).
391. 519 F.2d 559 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 423 U.S. 1031 (1975).
392. Plaintiffs were retired male employees of the state of Connecticut and members
of the State Employees' Retirement System, a retirement benefit plan established by the
State Employees Retirement Act, CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 5-152 to 5-192 (1958). 519 F.2d at 561.
393. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970), as amended, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972).
394. Defendants were the state treasurer, state comptroller, and the chairman of the
State Employees' Retirement Commission. 519 F.2d at 561.
395. Plaintiffs objected to §§ 5-162, 5-163, & 5-166, which granted women employees
having 25 or more years of state service the right to retire with full pension rights five years
earlier than similarly-situated men and provided rate differentials favoring female over male
employees who retired with less than 25 years of service. Id. at 561.
396. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 390 F. Supp. 278, 288-90 (D. Conn. 1974).
397. 519 F.2d at 563.
398. 323 U.S. 459 (1945).
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court initially determined that the eleventh amendment bars suits
brought primarily to recover money from the state. 9 Interpreting
Edelman as foreclosing retroactive payments of monetary damages
from state funds, the court found judgments requiring public
expenditures in connection with efforts to obtain or implement injunctive relief against the state permissible as having merely an
4 '
"ancillary effect on the state treasury.""
Distinguishing attorneys'
fee awards from impermissible relief against the state, the court
noted that claims for fee awards are not the essence of the lawsuit.
Having jurisdiction over the main action for injunctive relief, the
court determined that fees, like costs, may be assessed as incidental
to a prospective order.4 ' Referring to a previous decision0 2 the court
then suggested a second basis for its holding. Observing that it was
necessary for the plaintiff to incur counsel fees to invoke the court's
power to enjoin future illegal conduct by state officials the court
found that fee awards represent a cost of obtaining prospective relief.40 3 Given the limited resources of most plaintiffs seeking injunctive relief against state officers, the court reasoned that fee awards
are a necessary and substantial incentive for future enforcement of
federal law. 0 4 Moreover, the court asserted that, such awards serve
as an effective deterrent to future violations.0 5 Finding attorneys'
fees both ancillary and prospective within Edelman's meaning, the
court concluded that fee awards are not within the bar of the eleventh amendment.
C.

Comment

In approving attorneys' fee awards from state funds,
Fitzpatrick expands federal judicial power over state governments.
In Edelman the Supreme Court approved indirect financial consequences to state treasuries necessarily resulting from future compliance with federal court decrees.0 0 Fee awards, on the other hand,
399. 519 F.2d at 564.
400. Id. quoting Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 668 (1974).
401. 519 F.2d at 571. See Thonen v. Jenkins, 517 F.2d 3, 8 (4th Cir. 1975); Souza v.
Travisono, 512 F.2d 1137, 1139 (1st Cir. 1975); Class v. Norton, 505 F.2d 123, 126 (2d Cir.
1974); Jordan v. Fusari, 496 F.2d 646, 650 (2d Cir. 1974).
402. Class v. Norton, 505 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1974).
403. See id. at 127; Rodriguez v. Swank, 496 F.2d 1110, 1113 (7th Cir. 1974); Note, supra
note 337, at 1893-94.
404. 519 F.2d at 571. See Downs v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 65 F.R.D. 557, 561
(E.D. Pa. 1974).
405. 519 F.2d at 571. See Class v. Norton, 505 F.2d at 127; Gates v. Collier, 44 U.S.L.W.
2405, 2406 (N.D. Miss. Feb. 3, 1976).
406. 415 U.S. at 668.
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represent direct payments from state funds to reimburse litigants
for expenses resulting from defendant officials' past actions. Thus,
fee awards are not permissible "ancillary effects" on the state treasury within the meaning of Edelman v. Jordan.
While Edelman does not mandate fee awards, such relief seems
consistent with the overall prospective thrust of that decision. In
disallowing the payment of wrongfully withheld welfare benefits,
the Edelman Court noted that such relief was retroactive and unnecessary to protect the federal courts' ability to require future state
compliance." ' Fee awards are prospective both in purpose and general effect. Under the private attorney general and bad faith rationales federal courts award fees to encourage future enforcement and
deter future violations of federal law.' 8 Thus, fee awards, which
Fitzpatrick correctly characterized as a cost of obtaining future
compliance, seem permissible. Moreover, such awards do not seem
to be the kind of retroactive relief barred by Edelman. There the
Supreme Court found the relief sought to closely resemble damages.0 9 Fee awards differ from damages in several respects. First,
rather than compensating plaintiffs for the past breach of a legal
duty by state officials, fees reimburse the cost of obtaining a remedy. Second, the amount of such an award is generally not large
enough to seriously disrupt the state treasury.410 Finally, such
awards may be "tailored" to alleviate the fiscal impact on the
state's budgeting process.4 '
In reviewing the Second Circuit's allowance of attorneys' fee
awards from state funds, the Supreme Court should consider modification of the test employed in Edelman. Given the ambiguous
nature of attorney fees and the need for flexibility to accommodate
the competing policies of the eleventh amendment and Ex parte
Young, a mechanical prospective-retroactive or injunctivemonetary test seems inappropriate.4" 2 A better approach would be
one which balances the importance of fee awards to the enforcement
of federal statutes and vindication of constitutional rights against
undue federal involvement in legitimate state activities and disrup407. Id. See Note, supra note 337, at 1881.
408. See notes 253-59 supra and accompanying text.
409. 415 U.S. at 666 n.11, 668.
410. See Newman v. Alabama, 522 F.2d 71, 75-76 (5th Cir. 1975) (Gewin, J., dissenting); Note, supra note 337, at 1895-96 & n.126.
411. In Edelman the Supreme Court noted the possibility that an award might be
tailored but chose not to consider alternatives to the award before it. 415 U.S. at 665.
412. See Downs v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 65 F.R.D. 557, 561 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
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tion of state finances. Applying such a test to counsel fees the Court
should initially note that the inability of most individuals to finance
litigation against state governments and the unavailability of retroactive benefits make fee awards necessary to effectuate future state
compliance with the requirements of federal law. 13 While fee awards
may be recovered from state officials in their personal capacities, 14
recent court decisions have required a showing of bad faith 1 5 or even
malicious conduct" by defendant officials to justify such awards.
Thus, fee awards from state officers as individuals are seldom possible. Moreover, such awards do not unacceptably increase federal
judicial power over state programs. The fiscal burdens on state
treasuries entailed in judicial orders requiring prospective payments
can clearly be greater than those caused by attorneys' fee awards.', 7
Further, fee awards would ensure equal access to the courts for
persons seeking vindication of important federal rights. While the
Court has been unwilling to characterize access as a fundamental
right,"8 it has employed stricter scrutiny when restrictions limiting
access to the courts have prevented the securing of such rights.1 "
Since most suits seeking injunctive relief against state officers involve issues fundamental in nature or rights specifically protected
by the Constitution, it would seem that the Court should require a
strong interest by the states in prohibiting fee awards. Since fee
awards would not seriously disrupt state activities and programs, it
appears that the states lack sufficiently important interest to bar
such relief. Thus, after balancing the competing interests involved
it would seem that the Court should affirm Fitzpatrick and uphold
the power of the federal judiciary to award attorneys' fees.
413. See 415 U.S. at 691 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Note, The Outlook for Welfare
Litigation in the Federal Courts: Hagans v. Lavine & Edelman v. Jordan, 60 CORNELL L. REV.
897, 907-08 (1975).
414. See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232
(1974).
415. Skehan v. Board of Trustees, 501 F.2d 31, 43-44 & n.7 (3d Cir. 1974), vacated on
other grounds, 421 U.S. 983 (1975).
416. Class v. Norton, 505 F.2d 123, 127-28 (2d Cir. 1974).
417. See Gates v. Collier, 44 U.S.L.W. 2405 (N.D. Miss. Feb. 3, 1976); Note, Edelman
v. Jordan:A New Stage in Eleventh Amendment Evolution, 50 NOTRE DAME LAW. 496, 50102 (1975).
418. United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973). But see Note, Free Access to the Civil
Courts as a Fundamental ConstitutionalRight: The Waiving of Filing Fees for Indigents, 8
NEW ENGLAND L. REV. 275, 302 (1973).
419. See Goodpaster, The Integrationof Equal Protection,Due ProcessStandards,and
the Indigent's Right of Free Access to the Courts, 56 IOWA L. REV. 223, 253-54 (1970).
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CONCLUSION

Faced with increasing demand for legal services at reasonable
cost and the need for private enforcement of legal rights, the judiciary has expressed concern over the regulation of attorneys' fees. In
recent litigation, the courts have attempted to balance the interests
of consumers in obtaining legal services against countervailing ethical and social interests. In declining to exempt minimum fee schedules from the antitrust laws, the Goldfarb Court found that the
public interest in preventing unethical competitive practices did not
justify the greater consumer harm generated by price-fixing. Current litigation concerning legal fee advertising indicates that the
rights of consumers to receive information must be balanced against
the states' need to prevent fraud, misrepresentation, client neglect,
and other unethical practices. Careful balancing of these considerations indicates that the interests of consumers should ultimately
prevail, at least to the extent of limited fee advertising in legal
directories published by consumer organizations. In American Trial
Lawyers the New Jersey court upheld its schedule of maximum
contingent fees by finding that any possible infringement upon the
access of litigants to the judicial system was outweighed by the
clients' needs for protection from excessive fees. While the Alyeska
Court recognized the importance of fee shifting in the vindication
of federal statutory rights, it felt that fee awards were inappropriate
due to the inability of the federal judiciary to articulate an objective
standard. Finally, in viewing fee shifting as necessary to insure future state compliance with federal law, federal courts have awarded
fees from state funds despite objections that such awards impair
state sovereignty and disrupt state finances.
These developments have important implications for the powers of the judiciary. In establishing a schedule of maximum contingent fees, the court in American Trial Lawyers exercised a legislative function which it found inherent in its supervisory power over
the conduct of attorneys. However, by refusing to shift fees under
the private attorney general rationale, the A lyeska Court expressly
declined to recognize a judicial power to act legislatively. While
these decisions appear inconsistent, they can perhaps be reconciled.
The regulation of contingent fees upheld by the New Jersey court
more closely resembles an exercise of the traditional judicial power
over attorney discipline; furthermore, since the disciplinary power
is vested solely in the courts, a quasi-legislative court rule does not
usurp the province of the legislature. The award of fees in public
interest litigation under the private attorney general rationale, how-
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ever, arguably requires a subjective evaluation on the part of judges
to distinguish important rights from less important ones and
thereby invites encroachment upon the legislative branch. While
the courts appear unwilling to assume a purely legislative function,
a synthesis of these cases perhaps shows a trend in the courts to
expand judicial authority where the object of regulation is an independent legitimate concern of the judiciary.
Furthermore, these developments portend greater regulation of
the legal profession by the federal courts. Traditionally, the practice
of law has been controlled by state supreme courts in conjunction
with the organized bar. However, faced with the reluctance of these
bodies to institute needed reforms, the federal courts have evidenced an increased willingness to intervene. In Goldfarb the
United States Supreme Court invalidated under the federal antitrust laws minimum fee schedules promulgated without state approval. In pending litigation concerning legal advertising, the federal courts appear likely to use the first amendment to strike down
bar restrictions approved by state supreme courts. Thus relying
upon jurisdiction conferred by the federal constitution and statutes,
the federal judiciary seems to be establishing standards for the regulation of the legal profession previously vested in the states. While
the import of this trend is not yet clear, federal courts in future cases
might use other federal limitations such as due process and equal
protection, to scrutinize other state regulation of the practice of law.
Finally, these developments portend significant changes in the
delivery of legal services. The elimination of minimum fee schedules
and relaxation of restrictions on fee advertising appear likely to
reduce legal costs and expenses through price competition. The dissemination of fee information also seems likely to enhance public
knowledge of and thus increase consumer demand for legal services.
These changes promise to generate structural change within the
profession and lead to increased efficiency and economy in the provision of legal services. Increased demand will permit small firms
to undertake a wider range of services and to develop economies of
scale through greater specialization and use of paraprofessionals.
Competitive pressures may create new types of firms such as legal
clinics which are able to initiate more efficient procedures which
would result in better service at lower cost. While the implications
of these developments remain unclear, they promise to close the gap
between the need and availability of legal services, provide equal
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access to the courts for low and middle income consumers, and thus
make equal justice under law a practical reality.
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